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ABSTRACT

In 1790, 1804, and 1819, the U.S. House of Representatives debated measures intended
to restrict slavery and the transatlantic slave trade. During these three debates, slaveholding
representatives, primarily from the Lower South, attempted to call into question the general
government’s right to discuss and legislate on slavery, contending that, except for in a few
specific instances outlined in the Constitution, slavery was purely a state matter, not a national
one. Their opponents employed a variety of tactics to counter this idea. One particularly
effective approach was an expression of concern for the impact of slavery and the slave trade on
the national character—the nation’s honor or reputation among other nations of the Atlantic
world. Those who invoked concern for the national character did so as a way to keep slavery and
the transatlantic slave trade in the national dialogue and legitimize these issues as national
matters over which the general government possessed authority. In 1790, in response to three
antislavery memorials sent to Congress, a few representatives used national character and
national interest to combat the contention that the slave trade and slavery were not national
issues. In 1804, following South Carolina’s decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade,
members of the House invoked anxiety for the national character to censure the state’s actions,
using national character to discuss imposing a tax on the transatlantic slave trade. In 1819 and
1820, as the House debated a proposal to restrict slavery in the new state of Missouri,
representatives who favored restriction used concern for the impact of the spread of slavery on
ii

the national character to promote the general government’s authority to impose the restriction.
During all three debates, members of the House of Representatives used concern over what other
nations would think of the United States to validate discussion of antislavery measures in
Congress. Examining these debates about slavery and the slave trade through the lens of national
character provides valuable insight to the ambiguous relationship between slavery and the
general government, as well as the relationship between slavery and the founding principles of
the United States.
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INTRODUCTION
In 1819, antislavery advocate Robert Walsh wrote, “Since our independence, slave
holding has seemed to be fairly let loose to the Briton for the purposes of self-congratulation, and
of the execration of American existence.”1 Walsh wrote his book to refute several accusations
Great Britain had leveled at the United States in recent years; among these accusations was that
“The institution of slavery is the foulest blot in the national character of America; its existence in
her bosom is an atrocious crime—the consummation of wickedness, and admits of no sort of
apology from her situation.”2 Walsh acknowledged that slavery was the point upon which the
United States as a nation was most vulnerable to censure from European nations such as
England, listing several additional accusations from the British toward the United States. One of
these was the remarkably injurious statement “that her congress has remained indifferent to
[slavery’s] enormities.”3
This last accusation was far from true. Issues regarding slavery and the slave trade came
before Congress frequently between the ratification of the Constitution in 1789 and the moment
when Walsh wrote, and in the House of Representatives, at least, the men who ran the nation
reacted with anything but indifference. On several occasions, the topics of slavery and the slave
trade sparked heated debate in the House of Representatives. Three such occasions took place in
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Robert Walsh, An Appeal from the Judgments of Great Britain Respecting the United States of America
(Philadelphia: Mitchell, Ames, and White, 1819), 307.
2
Walsh, An Appeal, 308.
3
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1790, 1804, and 1819-1820. In 1790, three antislavery memorials led to disagreements
regarding the extent to which Congress was permitted to discuss the subjects of the slave trade
and, more particularly, slavery, and the powers Congress possessed over these matters. In 1804,
the question was one of the expediency of taxing the transatlantic slave trade as the Constitution
permitted. A decade-and-a-half later, Congress exploded over a proposed restriction to
Missouri’s admission to the Union as a state, a restriction that would lead to the end of slavery in
Missouri.
Individually, these three debates provide snapshots that illustrate the nation’s relationship
with slavery at particular moments. They provide brief insights into the ways in which the
general government addressed slavery and the slave trade and how slavery shaped divisions
within the nation. On the surface, these debates perhaps appear to have little in common besides
a general focus on the topics of slavery and the slave trade. On all three occasions, however,
members of the House of Representatives addressed the idea that slavery was a “blot in the
national character of America,” using it to inform and shape their debates and to support
antislavery causes in Congress. Placing these debates side by side, examining the “snapshots”
in a chronological succession, illustrates a long-lasting concern in Congress for the United
States’ standing among its fellow nations of the Atlantic world and the ways in which slavery
impacted that standing. Examining the debates in 1790, 1804, and 1819 and 1820 together
addresses the question of how members of the House of Representatives in the early republic
used a concern for the national character, or the nation’s reputation, to shape and define the
relationship between slavery and the general government and to make a case for general
government support for antislavery causes during that period.

2

First and foremost, by invoking concern for the national character to support their
arguments, representatives in Congress—particularly those opposed to slavery’s expansion—
were able to create space to discuss slavery and the transatlantic slave trade as national issues.
Those who supported general government’s power to regulate the slave trade and slavery used
slavery’s impact on the national character to counter the arguments from slaveholders—
primarily from the Lower South—and their allies that slavery and the slave trade were purely
state matters over which the general government had no authority. They also used the argument
that slavery had a negative effect on the nation’s character to justify attempting to exert
increasing amounts of government authority over the states to address the problem of slavery. In
1790, opponents of the slave trade or slavery used concern for the national character to support
the rights of antislavery petitions to be received and considered in Congress, countering
vehement proslavery arguments that slavery and the slave trade were issues that should be
addressed entirely at the state level. In 1804, members of the House invoked national character
both to support and to oppose a proposed tax on imported slaves. As in 1790, these
representatives sought to counter arguments based on state sovereignty, but they went beyond the
goal of merely creating a space for slavery as a national issue, using concern for the slave trade’s
impact on the national character to advocate the general government’s authority to rebuke a state
for involvement in the transatlantic slave trade. In 1819 and 1820, antislavery representatives
again used national character to justify contemplation of antislavery measures in Congress and to
counter state rights arguments that made slavery no business of the general government. This
time, the goal was not censure of a state, but congressional control over slavery in an incoming
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state. During all three debates, concern for the national character linked together slavery and
national interest every time a member of Congress chose to invoke it.
It should here be noted that the term “national character” can be understood in a variety
of ways. In common twentieth century social science usage, “national character” usually refers
to the specific, defining characteristics of the people of a nation.

It is the set of characteristics

shared by most of the people of a nation, ones that can be said to set someone apart as uniquely
“American” or “British” or “Japanese,” and so on.

Morris Ginsberg, a leading British

sociologist in the mid-twentieth century, also defined it as “the nature of the organization as
embodied in its institutions, its collective achievements, and its public policy.”4 By this
definition, national character is about national achievements and institutions, the things that set it
apart in the world. While this definition is in some ways similar to the way members of
Congress in the early American republic would have used the term, definitions focused on
unique characteristics do not fully address how these men would have understood or spoken of
national character.
David Waldstreicher helps to bridge the divide between modern usage of the term and the
way men of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries would have used it. He describes
“national character” as “a way of understanding the relationship between the citizen, or national
subject, and the state, or national government.”5 He includes in his definition ideas of the “body
politic” and of characteristics of the nation and its people. In late eighteenth and early nineteenth
century America, it allowed individuals to be understood in the context of their national culture
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Morris Ginsberg, quoted in Otto Klineberg, “A Science of National Character,” American Scientist 32,
No. 4 (October 1944): 274.
5
David Waldstreicher, In the Midst of Perpetual Fetes: The Making of American Nationalism, 1776-1820
(Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1997), 141.
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even as they shared in the formation of that culture. The idea of the national character, for
Waldstreicher, also comprehends within it the idea of an anthropomorphic state with “a
reputation in the world,” and it is this concept that applies most directly to the congressional
debates about the slave trade and slavery from 1789 to 1820.6
For many members of Congress, the nation, just like a gentleman of the period, possessed
a claim to a character or reputation. For gentlemen, a good character—his “good name”—
depended on his public virtue. This was character in the sense of “moral excellence and
firmness.” Gentlemen were expected to conduct themselves in a morally upstanding manner,
setting an example to their peers and the general public. In the same way, a nation could be
judged by its conduct. Robert Walsh wrote his Appeal with the goal of arresting and, if possible,
completely ending “the war which is waged [by the British] without stint or intermission, upon
our national reputation.”7 The idea of the national character, for the men in Congress, just as for
other concerned citizens, was centered on foreign perceptions of the United States as a nation. If
the United States conducted itself in a manner consistent with its avowed republican principles—
if it upheld its commitment to liberty and equality as outlined in the Declaration of
Independence, this reflected well on the national character. If, however, it behaved
inconsistently or in a way other nations, particularly those of Europe, perceived as less than
upstanding—by participating in the transatlantic slave trade, for example—this negatively
impacted the national reputation, or the national character.
It is for this reason that so many congressmen in the early republic expressed concern
about the national character, or the nation’s reputation among foreign nations, particularly

6
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European nations such as Britain, in regards to American participation in the transatlantic slave
trade and the growing institution of slavery in the nation—they were perceived as less than
virtuous and were, foreign detractors accused, inconsistent with the nation’s founding principles.
Appealing to a concern for the national character during congressional debates about slavery
helped to establish slavery and the transatlantic slave trade as national issues over which the
general government rightfully held some power. It combated the notion that slavery and the
slave trade were purely matters for the individual states and legitimized the slave trade and
slavery as national concerns that should be addressed in national politics.
Over the last few two or three decades, several historians have addressed this issue of the
role of slavery in the politics of the early American republic, though it was largely an unexplored
field prior to 2000.8 During the 2000s, however, this subject has received more attention, with
the historians pursuing questions relating to the topic falling more or less into two groups. The
first, and most popular, deals specifically with the role of slavery in the Constitution. Historians
such as David Waldstreicher and George William Van Cleve have argued recently that the
Constitution was not neutral on the issue of slavery, but was in fact a proslavery document. In
Slavery’s Constitution, Waldstreicher indicates the portions of the Constitution that directly
impacted slavery, as well as several sections with a less direct impact, to demonstrate the
Constitution’s role in upholding and perpetuating the institution. Van Cleve, in A Slaveholders’
Union, argues still more adamantly that the Constitution was a proslavery document. He also
claims that the Revolution, far from weakening slavery, as most people believe, left it stronger
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The only major work in this field prior to 2000 is Donald L. Robinson, Slavery in the Structure of
American Politics, 1765-1820 (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1970)., which focuses primarily on the
Founders and their decision to do nothing about slavery following the American Revolution.
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than ever. It did this by weakening the central government in America, transferring more power
to slaveholders.9
Sean Wilentz argues against this view that the Constitution supported slavery. In No
Property in Man, he uses a careful analysis of the Constitution and the debates at the
Constitutional Convention to show that, while the Constitution did not denounce slavery, the
situation is considerably more complicated than the simple claim that the Constitution was
proslavery. He contends that the careful omission of any recognition of “property in man” in the
Constitution resulted in a document that did not legitimize the institution of slavery, though it did
not actively oppose it, either. Wilentz traces debates concerning the relationship between slavery
and the Constitution between its inception and the outbreak of the Civil War, concluding that
“despite all the ways the Constitution reinforced human bondage and thwarted its abolition, [the
exclusion of acknowledgement of property in man] would help inspire and legitimize the politics
that...brought slavery to its knees.”10
Even while this debate over slavery and the Constitution remains ongoing, several other
historians have turned their attention to slavery in early republic politics more generally. Don
Fehrenbacher, in The Slaveholding Republic, explores the relationship between slavery and the
national government from the founding of the United States through the Civil War. He discusses
slavery’s impact on several aspects of national government, with particular attention to the
powers Congress specifically held over slavery. Fehrenbacher argues that during the period he
9

David Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution: From Revolution to Ratification (New York: Hill and Wang,
2009); George William Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union: Slavery, Politics, and the Constitution in the Early
American Republic (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2010); see also Leonard L. Richards, The Slave Power:
The Free North and Southern Domination, 1780-1860 (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University, 2000)and Paul
Finkelman, Slavery and the Founders: Race and Liberty in the Age of Jefferson (Armonk, NY: M.E. Sharpe, 1996)
for further examples of works that present the Constitution as a proslavery document.
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discusses, while the general government’s powers regarding slavery were limited by the
Constitution, the way people interpreted the intent of those constitutional limitations was in turn
shaped by the general government’s actions pertaining to slavery. His goal in this work is to tell
a complete story of the general government’s relations with slavery, looking at specific policies
over time as measurements of that relationship.11
In Slavery and Politics in the Early American Republic, Matthew Mason more
specifically demonstrates the role slavery played in national politics from the ratification of the
Constitution through the Missouri Compromise, with particular attention to the period following
the ban of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808. He shows that even when Congress was not
talking specifically about slavery, the rhetoric of slavery permeated congressional debates,
making slavery a central issue in early republic politics even when it was not explicitly the topic
under discussion. For Mason, slavery played a key role in shaping the sectional division
between North and South and was a central part of the dialogue of partisan politics. The War of
1812 marks a turning point in Mason’s narrative, as it intensified divisions over slavery in the
nation. The Missouri Crisis, far from being the fire bell in the night that Thomas Jefferson had
labeled it, was a bitter political conflict that had been several years in the making.12
John Craig Hammond also carefully examines the role of slavery in American politics
during this period, but with a rather different focus from Mason’s. In Slavery, Freedom, and
Expansion in the Early American West, Hammond challenges the traditional North-South
10

Sean Wilentz, No Property in Man: Slavery and Antislavery at the Nation’s Founding (Cambridge, MA:
Harvard University Press, 2018). See 268 for quote.
11 Don E. Fehrenbacher, The Slaveholding Republic: An Account of the United States Government’s
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sectional division framework most historians take for granted, insisting that in this early period,
the more important sectional division was between the East and the West, and slavery played a
crucial role in this division. Slavery gave the West a disproportionate power over the East, a
situation that persisted in every discussion of slavery in the American territories through the
1810s. Every U.S. territory from the old western states of Ohio and Mississippi to the territories
west of the Mississippi River grappled with the issue of slavery, even those where slavery was
restricted by the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. Every newly organized territory and state
contended with the issue of slavery, with large portions of every state insisting on the right to
hold slaves.13 As a result, these new states used the issue of slavery to shape national policy in
the West. The Missouri Crisis, taking place at a time when the national government had begun
to solidify its power over the West, made what had largely been a sectional issue restricted to the
West a national issue that polarized North and South.14
Other historians of slavery and politics in the early republic have focused on topics such
as the antislavery movement, the development and shaping of political parties, increasing
sectional tension, particular individuals’ views on and interactions with slavery, and the use of
slavery in political dialogue.15 Historians of slavery during this period, however, have focused

13

Even Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois—territories where slavery had been excluded by the Northwest
Ordinance—were home to proslavery factions that made strong cases for permitting slavery in each of these places.
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John Craig Hammond, Slavery, Freedom, and Expansion in the Early American West (Charlottesville:
University of Virginia Press, 2007).
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Examples include Padraig Riley, Slavery and the Democratic Conscience: Political Life in Jeffersonian
America (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2016); David F. Ericson, Slavery in the American
Republic: Developing the Federal Government, 1791-1861 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 2011);
Richard S. Newman, “Prelude to the Gag Rule: Southern Reaction to Antislavery Petitions in the First Federal
Congress,” Journal of the Early Republic 16 (Winter 1996): 571-599; Nicolas Wood, “John Randolph and the
Politics of Slavery in the Early Republic,” Virginia Magazine of History and Biography (Vol. 120, No. 2, Summer
2012): 106-143; Rachel Hope Cleves, “‘Hurtful to the State’: The Political Morality of Federalist Antislavery,”
Robert G. Parkinson, “‘Manifest Signs of Passion’: The First Federal Congress, Antislavery, and Legacies of the
Revolutionary War,” and Brian Schoen, “Positive Goods and Necessary Evils: Commerce, Security, and Slavery in
the Lower South, 1787-1837” in Contesting Slavery: The Politics of Bondage and Freedom in the New American
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substantially less on the ways in which Americans’ concerns about foreign perceptions of their
nation shaped the general government’s relationship with slavery. At a time when abolition was
a transnational cause in the Atlantic world, it only makes sense that foreign influences would
have an impact on political antislavery efforts at all levels of government.16 However, little has
been written on this topic, and most of what is written is focused on later British efforts to
entirely end the slave trade in the Atlantic.17 Several historians have highlighted events and
ideas that affected the role of slavery in politics and influenced the general government’s
approach to slavery. Focusing on Americans’ perceptions of their nation’s place in the world
and the impact of the perception of foreign judgments regarding the general government’s
involvement with slavery and the slave trade provides additional insight to the relationship
between slavery and the general government. Highlighting antislavery and anti-slave trade
congressmen’s use of national character to support their cause helps to counter the argument that
the Constitution was inherently proslavery and that the general government was predominantly a
proslavery institution. It also provides scholars with a clearer understanding of how the
antislavery cause gained an acknowledged, legitimate following in Congress in the years prior to
the Missouri Crisis. In a period when several argue the only major national antislavery success
was the close of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 and southern slaveholders shaped the nation
Nation, eds. John Craig Hammond and Matthew Mason (Charlottesville: University of Virginia Press, 2011).
16
See J.R. Oldfield, Transatlantic Abolitionism in the Age of Revolution: An International History of Antislavery, c. 1787-1820 (Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press, 2013) for a detailed overview of Atlantic
abolitionist networks. For other works that treat on this subject, see Seymour Drescher, Abolition: A History of
Slavery and Antislavery (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009); Robin Blackburn, The American
Crucible: Slavery, Emancipation and Human Rights (London: Verso, 2011); David Brion Davis, The Problem of
Slavery in the Age of Revolution, 1770-1823 (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1975).
17
Matthew Mason has written a couple of articles that deal, to some degree with this subject, but they are
focused almost exclusively on the abolition of slavery in the Atlantic, and they focus primarily on a later period than
this project. See Mason, “The Battle of the Slaveholding Liberators: Great Britain, the United States, and Slavery in
the Early Nineteenth Century.” William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, LIX, No. 3 (July 2002): 665-696, and
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into one friendly to slavery, it can be difficult to understand how Congress was able to entertain
any antislavery motions. Understanding early representatives’ preoccupation with the national
character helps to explain how antislavery causes gained any traction in Congress.
The congressional debates in 1790, 1804, and 1819-1820 show that, for many
congressmen, the general government’s approach to slavery played a significant role in
establishing and maintaining the national character. The debates also highlight the role that
concern for the national character had in the general government’s approach to the issues of the
slave trade and slavery. Members of Congress expressed their conviction during these debates
that the eyes of the world—particularly those of Europe—were upon them and upon their nation,
and the European nations would judge the United States by the way Congress addressed an issue
that a large portion of the Atlantic world regarded as a moral evil.
In 1790, the antislavery memorials from Pennsylvania and New York were the first of
their kind to come before Congress since the ratification of the Constitution. This was the first
time the new general government was confronted with the issues of the transatlantic slave trade
and slavery. The men in the House of Representatives were well aware that they would set the
precedent for how the House would deal with such issues in the future. While concern for the
national character formed only a small part of the debates in 1790, that concern helped to
sanction the discussion of slavery and the slave trade as national issues.
National character represented a much greater portion of the 1804 debate over taxation of
the transatlantic slave trade, which had recently been reopened in South Carolina. Indeed,
concern for the national character became a central point in the arguments of both representatives

“Keeping Up Appearances: The International Politics of Slave Trade Abolition in the Nineteenth-Century Atlantic
World.” William and Mary Quarterly 3rd Series, LXVI, No. 4 (October 2009): 809-832.
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who favored the proposed tax and some who opposed it. During this debate, the issue of taxing
the slave trade split the House into three groups. Just as in 1790, a group of representatives from
the Lower South opposed the tax on state rights grounds, arguing that South Carolina, as a
sovereign state, had the right to reopen the trade without interference from the general
government. The other two groups split over the meaning of the proposed tax; those who
supported it claimed it would benefit the national character, while those who opposed it insisted
it would be to the detriment of the national character. Though these groups disagreed over the
tax’s meaning, they shared the goal of expressing congressional disapproval of the slave trade
and of South Carolina’s actions. By making the national character a central part of their
arguments, they again established the general government’s interest in the slave trade and used
slavery’s impact on foreign perceptions of the nation to express the general government’s
disapproval of an individual state’s actions.
Several men who supported restricting slavery in Missouri, however, invoked concern for
the national character in an attempt to counter the adamant state rights arguments of their
opposition. These representatives, all of whom came from northern, non-slaveholding states,
used the national character to argue that the nation as a whole still had a stake in slavery and that
Congress had both a right and a responsibility to check the growth of slavery wherever possible
and constitutionally permissible. This was again a step further than many members of the House
had gone in 1804, for during the debates over Missouri’s entry into the Union, those who
incorporated a concern for the national character into their arguments used it to attempt to
establish general government control over slavery in an incoming state.

12

While in all three debates, the antislavery ideas and measures proposed were ultimately
unsuccessful, representatives’ expressed concerns for the national character of the United States
helped to establish the transatlantic slave trade and slavery as issues of national importance, ones
that by right should receive the attention and fall under the authority of the general government.
The idea that other nations were watching the United States’ actions in regards to slavery and the
slave trade helped to sanction congressional discussion of antislavery measures. Concern for the
national character created a space in the United States House of Representatives for antislavery
discussion and helped representatives to make a case for increasing government control over
slavery and the slave trade, countering the contention that slavery and the slave trade were issues
purely for the individual states.
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CHAPTER ONE
“THE INTEREST AND HONOR OF THE COMMUNITY”: ESTABLISHING SLAVERY AS
A NATIONAL ISSUE IN THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, 1790

In February 1790, three antislavery memorials came to Congress from Quaker Yearly
Meetings in Pennsylvania and New York and from the Pennsylvania Abolition Society (PAS).
All three memorials drew Congress’s attention to the transatlantic slave trade and asked for the
trade’s end. The memorials from the Quakers’ yearly meetings presented their arguments largely
in religious and moral terms, asserting that “both the true temporal interest of nations, and eternal
well being of individuals depend on doing justly, loving mercy, and walking humbly before
God,” and tying the fate of the slave trade to this ideal. The memorial from the PAS, while
articulating the same moral stance as the memorials from the yearly meetings, also drew heavily
upon ideals from the Revolution and the Constitution to support the society’s antislavery
position. It invoked the specific wording of the preamble to the Constitution that made
promoting the general welfare and securing the blessings of liberty a national priority, as well as
the ideas in the Declaration of Independence that “mankind are all formed by the same Almighty
Being,..equally designed for the enjoyment of happiness.,” and that “equal liberty was originally
the portion, and is still the birth-right of all men.” On these matters, the memorial asserted, both
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Christianity and “the political creed of Americans” agreed.18 All three memorials asked
Congress to uphold the cause of liberty and “step to the very verge” of their power to take action
against the slave trade.19
The Senate quickly tabled the memorials without further discussion, effectively signaling
their stance that the objects of the memorials were not a fit topic for discussion. The House was,
at the time, preoccupied with discussion of Hamilton’s plan for public credit, which would have
made it unsurprising if the memorials met the same fate there.20 In the House, however, the
memorials met with a different reception. Although representatives from the Lower South states
of South Carolina and Georgia, men such as Aedanus Burke, William Smith, and Abraham
Baldwin, attempted to have the petitions tabled as they had been in the Senate, the memorials
generated considerable debate. Responding to the petitioners’ attempts to establish antislavery
as a national cause, representatives from the Lower South emphasized at every opportunity their
belief that the memorials dealt with topics on which Congress had no authority. In opposition to
this lower southern stance, several representatives from Virginia and northward expressed their
opinion that the memorials raised issues of national interest. To these advocates of further
consideration of the memorials, the memorials deserved the attention of the House because
slavery and the slave trade impacted the national interest and the national honor and character.
1790 was not the first time an antislavery petition came before the United States general
government for consideration. In 1783, the Quakers of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting had sent
18

Annals of Congress, 1st Congress, 2nd Session, House of Representatives, 1239.
Kenneth R. Bowling, William Charles diGiacomantonio, and Charlene Bangs Bickford, eds.,
Documentary History of the First Federal Congress (hereafter DHFFC), Vol. 8, 322, 326.
20
For more detail on the impact of discussion of Hamilton’s financial plan on the debates surrounding the
memorials, see Howard A. Ohline, “Slavery, Economics, and Congressional Politics, 1790,” The Journal of
Southern History XLVI, No. 3 (August 1980): 335-360.
19
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to the Confederation Congress a petition to end the transatlantic slave trade. At that time, the
general government informed the Quakers that it had no power in this matter, as the slave trade
and slavery were state issues. For the rest of the 1780s, the Philadelphia Quakers and several
other antislavery organizations pursued an aggressive antislavery campaign, focusing first on the
transatlantic slave trade, then on emancipation. They achieved a fair amount of success in the
northern states as individual states banned the foreign slave trade and began emancipating the
slaves within their borders, either immediately or more gradually.21 In fact, by the time the
Constitution went into effect in 1789, only three states—North Carolina, South Carolina, and
Georgia—still permitted slave importation.22 Following the restructuring of the national
government initiated by the ratification of the Constitution, the Quakers decided to try again to
gain support from the general government to close the transatlantic slave trade completely.23
The memorial from the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting of Quakers was filled with religious
language and generally espoused antislavery as a moral position. In it, the petitioners expressed
their firm belief “that unfeigned righteousness in public as well as private stations, is the only
sure ground of hope for Divine blessing.” It was not enough, according to this logic, to oppose
slavery or the slave trade in private; one must be willing to take a public stance. For this reason,
the petitioners characterized the transatlantic slave trade as a “gross national iniquity” and asked
Congress to make the effort “to the full extent of your power, to remove every obstruction to
21
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public righteousness.” To make this request was the petitioners’ religious duty, they said. They
trusted that, if the members of Congress would but commit themselves to acting with justice and
mercy, the slave trade would be abolished.24
The Philadelphia Yearly Meeting’s memorial, shown to members of the New York
Yearly meeting prior to its presentation in Congress, prompted a similar effort from the New
York Quakers. Rather than focusing on general antislavery and religious principles, however,
the memorial from the New York Yearly Meeting focused on the specific problem of traders
who were exploiting a legal loophole in New York to prepare their ships for the transatlantic
slave trade in New York harbors because their home states forbade such activity. The Quakers
in New York had previously petitioned their state government to put an end to this practice,
which they saw as violating the spirit, if not the letter, of the traders’ states’ anti-slave trade laws.
The New York legislature had informed the Quakers that it could do nothing about the situation,
as it was the task of the general government, not the state, to address commercial matters of this
nature. Accordingly, the New York Yearly Meeting petitioned the general government about the
issue in a memorial accompanying that of the Philadelphia Yearly Meeting, asking “that
effectual provision may be made to restrain vessells from fitting and clearing out in any of the
ports in this State for the purpose of a trade to Africa for slaves.”25
The PAS, whose membership consisted primarily of Quakers, sent a memorial to
Congress that was less religious and more patriotic in tone. The PAS memorial expressed great
satisfaction that Congress had been vested by the Constitution with power for “promoting the
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Welfare & securing the blessings of liberty to the People of the United States.” It also stated the
PAS members’ “expectation, that nothing, which can be done for the relief” of those in bondage
“will be either omitted or delayed.” The PAS memorial went considerably beyond denunciation
of the transatlantic slave trade, asking Congress to act to the fullest extent of its power against
slavery itself, and it did so in a manner that sought to tie antislavery to the principles of the
American Revolution. The petitioners asserted their absolute belief that liberty was the birthright
of all men. They reminded Congress that the enslaved were the only ones “in this land of
freedom [who] are degraded into perpetual bondage, and who, amidst the general joy of
surrounding freemen, are groaning in servile insurrection.” The United States was a selfproclaimed free nation, yet the general government did nothing about the thousands of enslaved
people within the nation’s borders. This went a step beyond asking for the amelioration of the
slave trade, as the Quaker memorials had done; the PAS memorial asked Congress to consider
action against slavery itself. In the memorial’s close, the PAS made a further effort to connect
the issue of slavery to the wellbeing and standing of the nation, asking Congress to “devise
means for removing this Inconsistency from the Character of the American People” and to “Step
to the very verge of the Powers” the legislature possessed “for discouraging every Species of
Traffick in the Persons of our fellow Men.” According to the PAS memorial, slavery was not
just a matter of morals or a religious concern, though the memorial addressed these elements, but
a matter of the national character. It was, in the eyes of the authors of the memorial, opposite
“the true Principles of liberty” that ought to suffuse “this land of Freedom.”26
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Representatives from the Lower South were quick to protest any consideration of the
memorials or their objects. For these men, Congress could not cease discussion of the subject of
slavery too quickly. They reacted to the antislavery requests of the memorials with an immediate
attempt to convince their colleagues to table the memorials as the Senate had done, ending all
discussion of the memorials and their antislavery goals. Richard Newman writes of this attempt
to suppress discussion, “The First Congress...witnessed the earliest attempted gag rule.”27 Lower
Southern representatives had a couple of reasons to wish to avoid discussion of slavery and the
slave trade in Congress. First, they and their constituents had concerns about a strong centralized
government’s potential impact upon slavery. Unless they managed to establish early in the
course of the new government the general government’s lack of power over slavery, they would
face constant uncertainty about the perpetuity of slavery. They favored a strong national
government for many matters, but they generally “agreed that it must be rendered powerless
against the institution of slavery.”28 Establishing a precedent of tabling antislavery memorials
without discussion would be one effective way to keep power over slavery out of the hands of
the general government.
Of all the states in the union in 1790, South Carolina and Georgia were by far the most
reliant on slave labor. The representatives from the two states freely acknowledged this,
claiming that their states would fall to waste entirely without slaves to cultivate the land.29 In
large part because of this vested interest in slavery and the slave trade, when the memorialists
27
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attempted to make slavery and the slave trade national issues, the representatives from the Lower
South responded with arguments that these issues rightfully belonged to the individual states, not
the general government. The Constitution reserved to the states all powers not expressly
delegated to the general government, and power over slavery and the slave trade numbered
among these powers. Furthermore, as the part of the nation most heavily involved with the slave
trade and slavery, the states of the Lower South, not the nation as a whole, had the best right to
decide how to proceed, according to the representatives from the region. Slavery and the slave
trade, these representatives insisted, were state issues, not national ones.
Additionally, in many Lower Southerners’ opinions, slavery was no business of the
Quakers and the members of the PAS, as they did not have any slaves and so could not have any
vested interest in the institution of slavery. Without a vested interest in the subject under
consideration, representatives from the Lower South expressed doubts whether the Quakers were
justified in petitioning the general government about it. Ultimately, the representatives from the
Lower South asserted that they considered slavery and the transatlantic slave trade questions of
sectional interest; slavery was, they said, a sectional institution and therefore a sectional concern,
not a national one. The issues of the slave trade and slavery ought to be left to the individual
states, particularly the states of the Lower South, who had the greatest interest in slavery. It was
against southern interest, these representatives argued, to do anything with the antislavery
memorials except dismiss them. Furthermore, what the memorials requested was in direct
violation of the Constitution, the southern representatives contended, as the Constitution secured
to them the right to import slaves at least until 1808 and gave Congress no explicit power over
slavery, and little more over the slave trade.

20

Representative Aedanus Burke of South Carolina was one of the most vocal opponents of
the memorials. He lost no time in asserting that “the men in the galley come here to meddle in a
business with which they have nothing to do; they were Volunteering it in the cause of others,
who neither expected nor desired it.” Several of the men involved with the crafting and signing
of the memorials had come to Congress to lobby for their cause.30 To Burke, the memorialists’
and the lobbyists’ intent was to meddle where they were neither needed nor wanted. Slavery and
the slave trade were a matter of southern property rights, and depriving southerners of their
property could not materially affect the petitioners, removed from the situation as they were.
And if the House insisted on entertaining the antislavery memorials, it ought to wait for petitions
with the opposite position to come before Congress so that the representatives could reasonably
consider all sides of the issue. To proceed as his opponents intended to do, Burke said,
entertained a threat to southern property from people who would not feel the impact of the
consequences.31
Representative Thomas Tucker agreed with his fellow South Carolinian and advocated
dismissing the memorials “without further notice.” He stated, “Congress have no authority,
under the constitution, to do more than lay a duty of ten dollars upon each person imported.”
Furthermore, he believed, that duty would not have the effect the petitioners desired. In fact,
Tucker claimed, it might make the slaves’ treatment worse “because an interfered with the
subject, may excite a great degree of restlessness in the minds of those it is intended to serve, and
may be a cause for the masters to use more rigor toward them.” In other words, he was
concerned that any interference in slavery on the part of the national government might result in
30
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slave insurrection. This insurrection would result in consequences opposite those intended by
the memorials, as it would lead to harsher treatment of the very slaves for whom the memorials
expressed such concern. It was better, therefore, to stay out of the business entirely rather than to
risk making the slaves’ situations worse, particularly since the memorials desired more of
Congress than Congress could constitutionally deliver.32 Tucker, unlike the Quakers, certainly
had a material interest in the outcome of the debate. While he was trained as a medical doctor,
he had made his fortune as a plantation and slave owner. As such, he had a strong personal
interest in maintaining the states’ independence from the general government on the subject of
slavery. He also likely had firsthand knowledge of the fear of slave insurrection that haunted
many slaveholders.33
Representative Abraham Baldwin of Georgia expressed sorrow that the subject of slavery
and the slave trade had come before Congress at all “because it was of a delicate nature, as
respected some of the states.” He asked the House to remember the Constitutional Convention,
during which “the member from the southern states were so tender upon this point, that they had
well nigh broken up without coming to any determination.” Because of their dedication to
union, Baldwin claimed, the southern delegates had compromised, “and the constitution
jealously guarded what they agreed to.” The Constitution specifically safeguarded the right to
import slaves from Africa for a certain number of years. To cut short this guaranteed span of
time, or to take action against slavery in any way, Baldwin’s words suggested, would excite
southern sentiments to the point of endangering the union. Others in the House had argued that

31

DHFFC, Vol. 12, 286.

32

Ibid., 291.

33

DHFFC, Vol. 14, 857.

22

the memorials did not specifically call for the abolition of the slave trade, therefore the
representatives from the Lower South need not be alarmed. To this Baldwin replied, “I think, sir,
it prays for nothing else, and therefore we have no more to do with it, than if prayed to establish
an order of nobility, or a national religion.” Abolishing the slave trade was just as much against
the Constitution, in Baldwin’s opinion, as either of the actions he mentioned. He opposed
committing the memorials because their objects were unconstitutional and would negatively
impact the lower southern states.34
In addition to their defense of states’ individual rights to determine their involvement
with the slave trade, representatives from the Lower South also made it a point to vilify the
Quakers sending the memorials, hoping to discredit the memorials’ objects by discrediting the
memorials’ authors. They sought to shift the focus of the debates from slavery and the character
of the nation to the character of the people requesting general government interference in the
slave trade. The representatives strove to paint the Quakers as self-interested, traitorous religious
fanatics, contradicting the Quakers’ portrayal of themselves as patriots concerned primarily for
the national character and virtue. They were quick to point out the Quakers’ role in the recent
Revolution. Pacifism was a part of the Quaker religion, which meant the Quakers had not fought
with their fellow Americans against the British. Furthermore, some representatives pointed out,
many Quakers had supported the British, rather than the Americans. No matter how active or
passive the Quakers’ actions during the Revolution, lower southern representatives said, the
Quakers had been traitors. The Quakers’ appropriation of the Revolution’s ideals for the
antislavery cause was, therefore, nothing short of utter hypocrisy. Burke called the Quakers
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“base” and “treacherous” and insinuated that, during the Revolution, the Quakers had worked for
the enslavement of their own country. Representative James Jackson of Georgia seconded
Burke’s comments, reminding his colleagues in the House that Gordon’s history declared
Quakers “enemies to our cause and constitution.”35
By attacking the Quakers as a group, the representatives from the Lower South and their
allies hoped to break down the connection made in the memorials between slavery and the
national character. Attacks on the Quakers continued throughout the debates on the memorials,
as these representatives attempted to undermine the petitioners’ claims to the ideological high
ground that the slave trade negatively affected the nation. Jackson called the antislavery Quakers
“evil spirits hovering over our heads in the gallery,” and Burke compared them to “Milton’s
Lucifer, who entered Paradise in the shape of a cormorant.”36 Such debased figures, the Quakers
could not be the heirs of the Revolution; they had not supported the Revolution to begin with and
had no claim to its principles or to the virtue so valued by the leading men of the Revolution.
These religious images also denied the Quakers their claim to any sort of moral high ground for
antislavery.
Despite staunch opposition from the Lower South and lower southern representatives’
personal attacks on the Quaker petitioners, many representatives from the North and from the
Upper South supported sending the memorials to a committee for further consideration. Several
expressed their general opposition to slavery and, more particularly, the transatlantic slave trade,
but most based their support for further consideration of the memorials on a broader ideological
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base. They argued that American participation in the cruelties of the slave trade identified in the
memorials did not reflect well on the United States in the eyes of other nations. Several of the
representatives who supported sending the memorials to committee also took hold of the PAS
memorial’s comments about the ideals of the Revolution and the founding principles of the
nation, connecting the ideals of the memorials with the ideals of the nation.37
Following the presentations of the various memorials to the House, Representative Roger
Sherman of Connecticut moved that the memorials be referred to a special committee to
determine just what the limit of Congress’s authority was in the matter. The committee was to
“consist of one member from each state, because several states had already made some
regulations on this subject.”38 Including members from each state would presumably ensure
each state’s interests were represented and bring greater cohesion to the way the slave trade and
slavery were addressed in Congress.39
Sherman’s motion gained support from representatives from Virginia northward. Of the
representatives who did support sending the memorials to committee, several supported the
motion for moral reasons; they believed the slave trade was cruel and wrong and that Congress
ought to do all in its power to alleviate the suffering of those subjected to it. This was also the
point the memorial from the Pennsylvania Quakers had so strongly made. Others, however,
based their arguments for sending the memorials to committee on ideas that aligned more closely
with the principles outlined in the memorial from the PAS: the slave trade went against the
principles of the Revolution and negatively impacted the entire nation, making it a national issue.
37
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Representative Josiah Parker of Virginia was a slaveholder and generally opposed a
strong centralized government. However, he spoke in favor not only of sending the memorials to
committee, but of the cause they promoted, as well. To Parker, the issue of the slave trade was
one of “momentous concern to the future prosperity and happiness of the people of America.”
He considered it his duty “as a citizen of the union” to support the cause outlined in the
memorials and to take action as far as the Constitution would allow. As a slaveholder, Parker
did not oppose slavery, though “it is not surprising that he became a spokesman against the
further importation of slaves,” since in his home district it was economically and politically
advantageous to oppose the slave trade in favor of developing the domestic slave trade.40 Still,
even if he was motivated by self-interest, Parker viewed the transatlantic slave trade as a national
issue meriting, or even requiring, national attention. Though he never clarified just what he
meant by calling himself a “citizen of the union,” the phrase suggests a contrast with a citizen of
a particular state. Parker, in this moment, demonstrated his commitment and attachment to a
national agenda, at least as far as this matter was concerned. The slave trade, he asserted,
affected the happiness of the entire nation, not just those parts of the nation most invested in or
reliant on the trade, and it was on behalf of the whole United States—“as a citizen of the
union”—that he spoke in this moment.41
Representative Elias Boudinot of New Jersey likewise expressed his support for further
consideration of the memorials in terms of the interest of the nation: “It is not because the
petition comes from the society of Quakers that I am in favor of the commitment, but because it
39
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comes from citizens of the United States, who are as equally concerned in the welfare and
happiness of their country as others.” Burke and a few of his colleagues had expressed their
strong opinion that the memorials should receive no further consideration from Congress because
the Quakers had no right to interfere with slavery when they were not slaveholders. Boudinot
refuted this, considering the antislavery petitions as expressions of concern for the state of the
nation from citizens of the nation who had a right, as such, to be heard. The recently passed
constitutional amendments that comprised the Bill of Rights guaranteed to citizens of the United
States the right of petition, and denying petitions without further consideration would set an
undesirable precedent. More than this, though, Boudinot was in no doubt that it would benefit
the nation to put an end to the slave trade by any means possible, provided such an act was
constitutional and in Congress’s power. He did not advocate discussing the objects of the
memorials before a committee had investigated them, and he certainly did not support doing
anything beyond what the Constitution said might be done, but he saw the questions raised by
the memorials as national ones “well worthy of our consideration.”42
Both Roger Sherman of Connecticut and James Madison of Virginia pointed to the
situation outlined in the New York memorial to refute the lower southerners’ contention that
only the states could address the issues of slavery and the slave trade. According to Madison,
“The petition...speaks of artifices used by self-interested persons to carry on this trade; and the
petition from New-York states a case, that may require the consideration of congress.” The New
York Quakers had already appealed to their state government to put an end to the practice of
40
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foreign ships outfitting for the African slave trade in New York harbors. New York had already
banned the slave trade, but a loophole in the law allowed others to prepare to set sail for Africa
for the purpose of purchasing slaves to sell in the Americas. When the Quakers complained of
this to the New York government, though, the state government informed them that it was
powerless in this matter. The practice of the ships circumventing New York’s law against the
African slave trade dealt with the regulation of commerce, which was a matter for the national
government. With this history in mind, Madison suggested that the situation the New York
Quakers described might best be addressed by the national government.43
Sherman concurred with Madison’s opinion and suggested that “it would, therefore, be
proper to commit that petition, in order to ascertain what were the powers of the general
government, in the case doubted by the legislature of New-York.” At the very least, sending the
New York memorial to committee would give the House the opportunity to determine where the
power the New York Quakers desired could be found. The purpose of the committee was not,
after all, to abolish the slave trade; it was merely to ascertain what power Congress had related to
slavery and the slave trade. This was the first time slavery had received much attention in
Congress since the Constitution went into effect, and the general government was still striving to
define its powers and limitations. Both Madison and Sherman made a case for the general
government’s involvement with slavery when they expressed the belief that the national
government might be the only appropriate place to address some parts of the memorials.44
Slavery could be a matter of national concern because the Constitution made the general
welfare a matter of national concern, and the memorials contended that slavery affected the
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welfare and happiness of the nation as a whole. The memorial from the Philadelphia Yearly
Meeting asked Congress to “remove every obstruction to public righteousness,” clearly defining
the slave trade as one such obstruction. The New York memorial characterized the state’s
specific situation as one “deeply interesting to the rights of men,” an issue to which the United
States had ideologically committed itself during the Revolution.45
Despite lower southern efforts to brand those who sent the memorials as traitors and to
disconnect revolutionary and republican principles from the antislavery cause, several of the
memorials’ advocates drew upon these ideas when supporting sending the memorials to
committee. The strongest arguments in favor of further consideration of the memorials did not
come purely from invocations of republican ideology, however. Instead, the memorials’
supporters made their case by linking national interest to national honor and character.
Revolutionary republican ideology was a part of this, but more of it had to do with the idea of
national honor. James Madison agreed that the issues raised by the memorials were of national
concern. He particularly focused on the New York memorial’s concerns about foreign ships
fitting for the transatlantic slave trade in New York harbors, a problem that particularly might
merit Congress’s consideration. He stated, “If any thing is within the federal authority to restrain
such violation of the rights of nations, and of mankind, as is supposed to be practised in some
parts of the United States, it will certainly tend to the interest and honor of the community to
attempt a remedy.” The community to which Madison referred was the community of the
nation. He advocated further consideration of the objects of the petitions to promote the national
interest and the national honor. Congress need not go against the Constitution to act on the
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memorials. True, Congress was forbidden from abolishing the transatlantic slave trade at that
time, but it was worth considering what Congress could do. Madison offered as an example that
Congress might pass some sort of regulation regarding the introduction of slavery to new states.
The point was, though, that the memorials were about more than material interest. What
Congress could do Congress ought to do, as it would affect the nation’s honor, its character.46
Representative Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts claimed that “He thought nothing would
excuse the general government for not exerting itself to prevent, as far as they constitutionally
could, the evils resulting from such enormities as were alluded to by the petitioners; and the
same considerations induced him to highly commend the part the society of Friends had taken it
was the cause of humanity they had interested themselves in.” According to Gerry, the national
government had not just a right, but an obligation to address the issues presented by the
memorials, so far as the Constitution allowed. Gerry personally had a complicated relationship
with centralized government; he was one of three delegates to the Constitutional Convention
who had left without signing the document because he objected to its lack of a declaration of
rights.47 In this case, however, he showed no uncertainty about whether or not the slave trade
was an appropriate issue for the general government’s discussion. In fact, he claimed, this was a
matter he hoped every nation would address, “to wipe off the indelible stain which the slavetrade had brought upon all who were concerned in it.”48
While these early articulations of concern about the national character were not as strong
or as developed as they would later become, they accomplished several important objectives.
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First, and most important, they made a convincing case that the slave trade and slavery were
national issues, though they recognized that Congress had no power to abolish slavery in the
states where it existed and was limited as to what it could do regarding the slave trade at that
point. While not every part of the United States had large numbers of slaves, and only a few
states still participated in the transatlantic slave trade, the presence of slavery in the nation, and,
more importantly in this debate, the participation of any part of the nation in the nefarious slave
trade reflected poorly on the nation. It went against the nation’s honor and diminished its
standing in the international community.
After a couple of days of debate about committing the memorials, the House voted to
refer the memorials to a special committee for further consideration and investigation. The
committee was to examine the requests made in the memorials and consider what Congress
could do with respect to the petitions. A few weeks later, the committee presented its findings in
a report. In the report, the committee affirmed that Congress was restrained from closing the
transatlantic slave trade or “interfering with the emancipation of slaves” before the
constitutionally stipulated year of 1808. The report also asserted that Congress could regulate
the slave trade, including providing for the humane treatment of slaves en route to the United
States. Congress could not “interfere in the internal regulation of States relative to the
instruction of Slaves in the principles of Morality or Religion” or in slave treatment in any way,
but it could tax the importation of slaves, and it could “prohibit Foreigners from fitting our
Vessels in any port of the United states for the Slave trade.” The committee assigned to report
on the memorials acknowledged that Congress could do little regarding the memorialists’
requests, but the lower southern representatives were still displeased with the report, and this
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time they had more allies, primarily from other slaveholding states. The conclusion of the report
stated that Congress would, as the memorials had requested, pursue the end of the transatlantic
slave trade and slavery wherever it had authority to do so.49
A couple weeks later, after the members of the House had time to look over the report,
the House began discussing and debating it. The debate that began on the sixteenth echoed many
of the themes that had dominated the February debates. The representatives from the Lower
South protested so much as talking about the subject, suggesting more than once that the House
postpone its discussion of the report, perhaps indefinitely. Those who stood against the Lower
South made their case in terms of national interest and honor. For a week, between March 16
and March 23, the House, as a Committee of the Whole, debated every section of the report and
the issues of slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, sometimes heatedly.
What had changed, however, was the number of people who stood against the Lower
South. The right of the memorials to be heard and considered had been one thing; the report
from the special committee was quite another. The language of the report, rather ambiguous on
many points, left open the possibility that Congress might attempt to emancipate slaves after
1808, as well as potentially end the slave trade. Representative Alexander White of Virginia,
who had supported sending the memorials to the committee, “advised that the report be
completely ‘struck out’...and replaced with just a few simple stipulations” limiting congressional
power.50
Several representatives proposed amendments to the report, a number of which passed,
resulting in a final report that looked little like the original. Finally, on March 23, after a week of
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heated debates and minimal progress, Madison moved “that the proceedings of the committee of
the whole should be entered on the journals, as the best method for putting an end to the
business,” as he considered it improper to pass the resolutions outlined in the report as abstract
declarations. Entering the proceedings in the journals would provide the public with
information, show the general feelings of the House concerning the antislavery memorials, and
suggest that Congress would exercise the powers it possessed as appropriate.
In response to this motion, congressmen who had been quiet in the debates prior to this
point objected to entering the resolutions in the journals of the House. Their objections focused
on the lack of necessity of such an action and the desire that the resolutions be taken up by the
House for consideration. Others sided with these men for a variety of reasons. William Smith of
South Carolina, however, opposed both entering the reports on the House journal and further
considering the resolutions of the report. He particularly expressed concerns that the resolutions,
both in their original and their revised versions, were to be entered along with the debates.
Smith’s objection was that no indication of which resolutions had been approved and which
rejected would be entered with them, and that the House would not vote upon Madison’s motion,
yet the report would “be called an act of the House.” In Smith’s opinion, the report would gain
the weight of law without any opportunity for the members of Congress to pass or reject it.51
Madison disagreed with Smith’s objections, stating “it was in the power of any member
to move, at any time, for a bill to the same effect.” In other words, anyone who wanted to could
call for a vote on it later. Entering the proceedings in the journals seemed, to him, the “most
conciliating and proper” way to resolve the issues that had been raised by the memorials and the
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report. He also acknowledged that it was “impossible to shut the door altogether against this
business.” There was no way to simply let the matter fall into obscurity or keep from addressing
it in the future. His motion seemed to him and to many of his supporters the best way to put the
business to rest for the time being, while presenting the possibility of addressing it further in the
future. It would not give the report the weight of law, as Smith feared, but it would leave a
record and leave open the possibility of revisiting the report at a later date. A vote was taken,
and Madison’s motion passed.52 Both the original report and the amended one were entered on
the House journals.
During both the debates over sending the memorials to a select committee and the
debates over the committee’s report, several congressmen expressed their support for the
memorials and their objects in nationalist terms. Just as the memorial from the PAS had, these
men represented slavery as a blight on the national character. Even as these representatives
endeavored to show that slavery was a matter of national concern, representatives from South
Carolina and Georgia repeatedly expressed their opinion that the national Congress should not be
discussing slavery or the memorials because slavery was purely a sectional issue. These same
representatives gave long, impassioned speeches in defense of slavery as an institution and the
necessity of the transatlantic slave trade to their states’ prosperity. While arguments against
Congress’s involvement in the objects of the memorials ultimately prevailed, those who
forwarded nationalist arguments for considering the memorials laid the foundation for
consideration of slavery as a national issue and set the precedent of entertaining antislavery
materials in Congress.
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While one might argue that the representatives of the Lower South gained more ground
over the course of the debates over the antislavery memorials—essentially, that the Lower South
“won”—this interpretation overlooks the fact that the House set important precedents over the
course of this debate. Congress considered for the first time exactly what power and authority it
possessed over slavery and the transatlantic slave trade, and while that authority amounted to
very little, it had still received conscious attention in the House of Representatives. Furthermore,
those who claimed that slavery was by right a national issue had opened the door for the further
discussion of slavery and the slave trade at the national level, a door that Madison had called
impossible to shut. They had asserted that the slave trade was a national problem and established
Congress’s willingness to hear from the opponents of slavery. Over the next several years,
various antislavery groups sent petitions and memorials to Congress, and these were heard and
considered, though the fact remained that not much could be done. The most important
achievement of the supporters of the right of the memorials to be heard was opening the door to
further discussion of slavery and the slave trade.
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CHAPTER TWO
“EVERYTHING COMPARED WITH A GOOD NAME IS ‘TRASH’”: NATIONAL
CHARACTER AND THE 1804 DEBATE ON TAXING THE TRANSATLANTIC SLAVE
TRADE

In December 1803, the South Carolina legislature voted to end the state’s ban on the
transatlantic slave trade, a ban that had been in place for more than a decade.53 South Carolina
had historically had a complicated relationship with the slave trade. During the Constitutional
Convention, the delegates from South Carolina fought against efforts to close the trade on the
national level, even threatening to leave the convention entirely. It was largely due to the efforts
of these men that the Constitution included the provision for a twenty-year protected window for
the slave trade. Somewhat ironically, South Carolina had suspended slave importation even
before the new constitution went into effect. At that time, in 1788, the decision was largely an
economic one intended to stop the flow of specie out of the state. In 1792, South Carolina
briefly reopened the trade, but the racial violence of the Haitian Revolution led to a swift reversal
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of that decision. As late as 1802, the state legislature was nearly unanimous in its decision to
keep the transatlantic slave trade closed.54
Clearly, the situation had changed by late 1803. The reason a representative from South
Carolina later gave for repealing its ban was that it had proven too difficult to enforce.
Representative Thomas Lowndes stated that many had evaded the law, with the effect that the
number of newly-imported slaves introduced into South Carolina over the previous few years
had been little short of what it would have been without the ban. This being the case, he said, “It
appears to me to have been the duty of the Legislature to repeal the law, and remove from the
eyes of the people the spectacle of its authority being daily violated.”55 Such rampant disregard
of the law made it of little effect and undermined the state government’s authority. In this light,
Lowndes argued, it only made sense to repeal the ban.
Besides this declared reason, several other factors may help explain the state’s motives.
Foremost among these is the acquisition of the Louisiana Purchase territory earlier that year. To
many South Carolinians, that largely unsettled land could not be cultivated without slave labor,
and that labor had to come from somewhere. Many believed that the newly acquired territory
would quickly be overrun by slaves from the Caribbean, as it was a readily accessible source of
slaves, and they feared that the rebellion and racial violence taking place in the Caribbean at that
time would spread to the United States. Slaves imported directly from African seemed far
preferable to the possibility of rebellious slaves from other sources. Other potential reasons for
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the repeal include a desire to provide a legal alternative to the illegal trade of slaves from the
Caribbean, and the rise of cotton as a cash crop in the state.56
Whatever the reason the members of the South Carolina legislature decided to repeal the
state’s prohibition of the transatlantic slave trade, the other states of the Union met the decision
with outrage and censure. In the Hartford Courant, an article appeared that denounced the South
Carolina legislature’s actions in rather inflammatory language, stating that “This abhorred traffic
in human flesh calls for the severest reprehension of every government and every man who
countenances or upholds it.” The leaders in South Carolina, according to the author, were
doubly culpable for this decision, as they purported to “be all on fire for the rights of man” and
were “distinguished for their clamour about liberty and equality.”57 Even slaveholding states
such as North Carolina, Tennessee, and Maryland passed resolutions urging a constitutional
amendment that would allow the general government to end the slave trade before 1808.58
In January 1804, one short month after South Carolina repealed its ban on the
transatlantic slave trade, David Bard brought the matter to the attention of the House of
Representatives. Bard, former frontier missionary and clergyman and a representative from
Pennsylvania, rose to express his disapproval of South Carolina’s actions and to propose a
resolution “that a tax of ten dollars be imposed upon every slave imported into the United
States.” He stated, “Had I been informed that some formidable foreign Power had invaded our
country, I would not, I ought not, be more alarmed than on hearing that South Carolina had
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repealed her law prohibiting the importation of slaves.”59 Other Americans shared his sentiment,
and he invited the members of the House to join the states in expressing disapproval of South
Carolina’s reopening of the trade. Bard’s purpose in proposing the resolution was to
demonstrate the general government’s disapprobation of South Carolina’s repeal. Congress
could not close the trade entirely, but the Constitution did permit that “a tax or duty may be
imposed on such Importation, but not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.” This tax, the
highest the Constitution would allow, would show that Congress would do all within its power to
act against the transatlantic slave trade and express disapproval of South Carolina’s decision to
reopen that trade.
This was not the first time a congressman had proposed levying the constitutionally
sanctioned tax; Representative Josiah Parker of Virginia had proposed a tax as early as 1789, but
it had not passed.60 Though the idea was far from new, however, and the members of the House
universally expressed their distaste for the slave trade, Bard’s proposal still sparked debate.
Three major factions quickly emerged. One sided with Bard, supporting the proposed tax and
contending that it would show the general government’s disapproval of the transatlantic slave
trade and South Carolina’s actions. Another faction opposed the resolution on the grounds that
South Carolina was within its rights as a sovereign state to repeal its ban, and that to tax the trade
would be unfair to South Carolina. The third faction also opposed the tax, but the reason the
representatives gave for their opposition was that they disagreed over the probable effect of the
tax. They contended that the proposed tax, rather than discouraging the slave trade, would give
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it official government sanction. While the middle faction argued staunchly on state rights
grounds, the groups who focused their arguments on the meaning of the tax connected that
meaning to the national character. Representatives from both groups agreed that the transatlantic
slave trade reflected poorly on the United States as a nation, but they disagreed as to the probable
effect of the proposed tax thereupon.
Bard’s resolution passed despite the opposition, and the members of the House were
invited to present bills to implement the proposed tax. Accordingly, Representative John
Randoph of Virginia brought a bill before the House to tax the transatlantic slave trade. At first
glance, Randolph would seem an unlikely candidate to present such a bill. He was well known
during his own time and is still best known by historians today for pioneering proslavery
political tactics in the early republic. As historian Nicholas Wood points out, though, “Randolph
was dedicated to the preservation of property rights and southern political power....But he also
loathed slavery—especially slave trading—and supported federal action against slavery when it
fell under clearly defined powers of the federal government.”61 The tax was clearly under the
defined powers of the general government, and Randolph’s presentation of the bill speaks to his
opposition to the slave trade and his belief that the tax could be effective against the trade.62
Upon the presentation of the bill, a representative from South Carolina moved that the
bill be postponed. Postponement was an established means in Congress of ending debate on an
issue without a vote, and the representative freely acknowledged that his goal was “to get rid of it
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altogether.”63 He pointed out that every member of the House who had spoken on the resolution
had conceded that taxing the transatlantic slave trade would not reduce the number of enslaved
people imported, so the tax would not accomplish what he believed was its purpose. Others in
the House supported postponement of the bill on the grounds that South Carolina reportedly
intended to reinstate the ban on the slave trade soon. They preferred to give the state the
opportunity to end the trade without outside interference that could potentially bring about
undesirable results.64
In the end, despite the efforts of Bard and his supporters, while the resolution passed, the
House voted to postpone John Randolph’s bill to implement the tax on the African slave trade,
effectively defeating the measure without actually voting against it. Though the Constitution
specifically allowed Congress to place a tax of ten dollars upon all slaves imported to the
country, such a tax was never passed. In 1804, the issue split the House into three groups or
factions. The representatives who argued against the tax on the grounds of state sovereignty and
equality did so with similar motives to those of the Lower South representatives who had
invoked state rights in the 1790 debates: they wanted Congress to drop the subject. They were
less militant about their agenda, and unlike in 1790, they offered no defense of slavery as an
institution, but they moved multiple times to postpone the matter, which would effectively end
discussion of it. For those who favored the tax, invoking the national character followed the
precedent antislavery forces in the House had set in 1790. It also fit with the efforts throughout
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the Atlantic at the time against the slave trade.65 For the third faction, however, the choice was
decidedly less clear. They opposed the proposed tax, but they did not wish to align themselves
with the pro-state rights faction, as such a position did not, for them, express sufficient
disapproval of South Carolina’s actions. Using concern for the national character to oppose
taxing the slave trade allowed them to speak and vote against the proposed tax without
sacrificing future opportunities to address slavery and the slave trade as national issues. It
allowed them to oppose the tax while still expressing disapproval for South Carolina’s actions.
One of the most pressing issues in regards to the effects of the tax involved South
Carolina’s rights as a state. During the 1790 debates, over the antislavery memorials,
representatives from the Lower South had contended heatedly that slavery and the transatlantic
slave trade were matters for the states to decide for themselves individually, a stance that was
largely upheld by both the report from the committee and Congress’s subsequent inaction on
these issues. After all, power over slavery was not given to the general government in the
Constitution, and power over the slave trade was specifically denied the general government
until 1808. In the meantime, this meant the power was reserved to the states. The same
argument appeared in the debate over taxing the slave trade. South Carolina, as a sovereign state
with power over slavery and the slave trade, was well within its rights to repeal her prohibition
on the trade, according to some representatives, no matter how repugnant people might find that
decision.
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Speaker of the House Nathaniel Macon, a representative from North Carolina, expressed
his concerns about the proposed measure in plain terms. He restated the hope of advocates of the
tax that it would show the hostility of Congress to the importation of slaves. Macon found this
objective somewhat problematic, however, as the effect of the tax seemed to him “an attempt in
the General Government to correct a State for the undisputed exercise of its Constitutional
power.” No one argued that South Carolina did not have the right to decide whether or not to
allow the importation of slaves from Africa, just as no one argued that the slave trade was a good
thing. For the general government to censure a sovereign state for an action within that state’s
rights, though, stepped on those very rights.66
Representative Benjamin Huger, a slaveholder from South Carolina, agreed with Macon.
He assured his listeners that, had he been in his state’s legislature—a position he had previously
held—when South Carolina repealed the ban on the slave trade, he would have opposed that
repeal. As it was, though, he was in the national Congress as South Carolina’s representative,
“and after the State had exercised their undoubted right, however he might dislike the measure, it
was his duty to defend the right which they had to adopt it.” He might not have agreed with his
state’s decision, but Huger affirmed that it was the state’s decision to make. For this reason,
Huger could not agree to an act that would “censure [South Carolina] for doing that which she
had an undisputed right to do.”67 Huger further pointed out that the “Eastern States” imported
redemptioners from Germany without the national disapproval South Carolina experienced for
the slave trade. He asked his colleagues “from the Middle and Eastern States [to] recollect that
the situation of South Carolina [was] very different from that of their States,” further showing
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that in his mind, the issue was not one for the nation as a whole, but ought to be confined to the
individual states or to the region most invested in slavery. The eastern states were not totally
faultless in their labor practices, so they should not condemn southern ones for the source of their
labor.68
In addition to concerns about South Carolina’s sovereignty, some representatives also
voice their concern that South Carolina would be unfairly affected by the proposed tax. After all,
South Carolina, as the only state that permitted slave importation at the time, would be the only
state required to pay the tax. For several representatives, this was closely linked with the
peculiar needs of the slaveholding states. No one was defending slavery or the slave trade, at
least not in any positive terms, but neither was everyone fully denouncing the institution.
Representative Thomas Lowndes of South Carolina, defending his state’s decision, claimed that
his state only repealed its ban on the slave trade because it had proven unable to enforce the ban.
Illegal slave importation was such a rampant problem that the law against it was virtually
meaningless. Lowndes suggested that this was the fault of the general government, which had
not provided the help to which South Carolina was entitled by virtue of the fact that the state
gave the revenue it received from foreign trade to the national government, which ought to
entitle the state to help in this matter, which dealt with foreign trade. Lowndes laid the blame for
the illegal slave trade upon the national government and upon his “Eastern brethren,” who had
continued the trade after it was banned. In other words, South Carolina could not be held
responsible for the decision to permit the transatlantic slave trade; without the support of the
general government and other regions of the country, it could not stand against the trade on its
own. The repeal of the ban was not about slavery, Lowndes claimed, but about maintaining state
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authority, for the rampant disregard for the state law against the slave trade had been counter to
good order within the state.69
Representative Willis Alston of North Carolina supported Lowndes’s claim that a tax
upon slave imports would be unfair to South Carolina. He asserted his belief that the tax would
unfairly burden South Carolina,; after all, “no State in the Union would be affected except South
Carolina.” Any time the House of Representatives considered laying a tax, he said, its members
ought to make the effort to select objects for taxation that would affect the entire nation as
equally as possible. Taxing the transatlantic slave trade would clearly not affect all parts of the
nation equally. Alston further stated, rather pointedly, that “Those gentlemen who are not
interested [slavery] ought to let us alone, and permit us to enjoy it as the necessity requires.” For
Alston, taxes should be fair, and slavery and all issues pertaining thereunto were best left to the
states that were most concerned with them.70
The representatives from the Lower South who opposed the proposed tax made their case
in terms of state sovereignty and equality between the states. To counter them, those who
supported the tax had to establish the transatlantic slave trade and South Carolina’s participation
therein as a national matter requiring the attention of the national government. A couple of
representatives attempted to do this by attacking the claim that that tax singled out South
Carolina. Representative Ebenezer Elmer of New Jersey insisted that he “did not see that this
measure had any pointed relation to South Carolina in particular.”71 In a similar vein,
Representative John Lucas of Pennsylvania stated, “It cannot, I think, be justly said, by imposing
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this tax we single out the State of South Carolina.” He took the point further than Elmer had,
though, asserting “If the tax shall operate more on South Carolina than on any other State, it will
not be our fault....The remedy is in her hands; she can when she pleases prohibit the importation
of slaves, and the tax, so far as it falls on her, will immediately cease.”72 In other words, the
extent to which the proposed tax would affect South Carolina—or any other state—for that
matter—was entirely up to South Carolina, according to Lucas. The tax was a national one and
would be equally in force in all parts of the nation.
More members of the House who supported taxing the transatlantic slave trade, however,
used arguments based on a concern for the national character to nationalize the issue. They
insisted that South Carolina’s decision to reopen the slave trade tarnished the national reputation
in the eyes of the world, which they did not hesitate to say were upon the United States.
Representatives in this group argued that participation of any part of the nation in the
transatlantic slave trade negatively impacted the character of the entire nation. Placing a tax on
that trade, they claimed, would show the nations of the Atlantic world that even though the South
Carolina legislature had chosen to lift its ban on the trade, the general government did not
In his initial speech in defense of his resolution, Bard left no one in any doubt that he
believed the world was watching the United States and judging the nation and the general
government’s involvement with slavery and the transatlantic slave trade. He unequivocally
stated that the members of the House owed it “indispensably to ourselves and to the world,
whose eyes are on our Government, to maintain its republican character.”73 The general
government had a responsibility to conduct itself in a manner that demonstrated the nation’s
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commitment to freedom from tyranny and oppression. The national conduct should be above
reproach if the nation was to maintain its character in the eyes of the nations of the Atlantic
world. Slavery and the slave trade stood in direct opposition to that goal. Bard asked his fellow
representatives, “Will foreigners concede this high character to us, when they...find that we hold
a million of men in the most degraded slavery?”74 They would not, he said, but would instead
see in the nation “the principles of tyranny.”75 This outcome was of all things most undesirable
to Bard, as it was deeply detrimental to the national character. It would take away the nation’s
good name, and Bard believed that “Everything compared to a good name is ‘trash;’ and it rests
with us whether we will preserve or destroy it.”76
That the United States might preserve and not destroy its good name was Bard’s goal in
proposing the tax on the slave trade. He told the members of the House that “if any of the States
engage in the trade, the tax will have two effects—it will add something to the revenue, and it
will show to the world that the General Government are opposed to slavery, and are willing to
improve their power...for preventing it.”77 Implementing the full tax that the Constitution
allowed would show the Atlantic world that the general government of the United States was
acting against the slave trade to the extent of its abilities. Bard considered this effect far more
important than that of raising revenue, which he said was only an incidental effect of taxing the
slave trade. Discouraging the trade—and slavery by extension—was his chief goal. Nearly onefifth of the population of the United States was enslaved, Bard pointed out, “a fact that must have
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the weight to sink our national character, in spite of volumes to support it.”78 The nation had a
great deal in its favor and had a reputation abroad as well as at home as a land of liberty and “an
asylum for the oppressed of all nations,” but the nation’s involvement with the slave trade
threatened to destroy that. Bard appealed to his fellow representatives’ pride in their nation,
asserting “If...we hold a consistency of national character in any estimation, we will give every
discouragement in our power to the importation of slaves.”79 This was what he meant the tax to
do, to discourage the transatlantic slave trade and to uphold the national character.
Representative Samuel Mitchell of New York agreed that Bard’s proposed tax would
discourage and show the general government’s disapproval of the slave trade. Mitchell, who had
been raised a Quaker, was perhaps the most outspoken opponent of slavery and the slave trade
during this debate.80 Despite his statement at the beginning of his speech in support of the tax
that “he would...say nothing on the immorality” of the slave trade or its “repugnance to...the
spirit of our free Government,” he spent a significant portion of his time denouncing the
conditions of the transatlantic slave trade.81 He also reminded his colleagues in the House that
the enslaved posed a danger to the nation, pointing to the events on Saint Domingue as the
ultimate example of what could happen if the slaves ever chose to rebel. To Mitchell, slavery
was “a dark spot on some of the members of the national body, which was spreading wider,
turning black, and threatening gangrene all around.”82 He acknowledged that the general
government could do nothing to end the slave trade or slavery at that moment; it could not do
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anything to punish South Carolina for the decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade, nor
could it force the state to close the trade again. Slavery was a part of the nation, “and Congress
could not put an end to it.” What Congress could do, however, was “interpose its authority, and
discountenance [the slave trade] as far as possible” by passing the constitutionally permitted tax
of ten dollars per person imported.83 This would show the general government’s disapproval of
the slave trade, even if it could not yet end the nation’s participation in the trade altogether.
Like Mitchell, Representative Joseph Stanton, Jr., of Rhode Island was quite vocal in his
opposition to slavery. He related to the members of the House his recent experience witnessing
“twenty or thirty negroes, chained to each other, and drove like mules to market,”84 hoping to
arouse his fellow representatives’ sympathy for those in bondage. The transatlantic slave trade,
he asserted, “tarnishes the American character.”85 Stanton, like Mitchell, acknowledged that the
general government could not prohibit the slave trade before 1808. The government’s power
was limited by the Constitution in this matter. For this reason, “to lay a tax being the only
Constitutional power the General Government possess,” he thought it best to exercise that
power.86 Until 1808, this was the best way for the general government to discountenance the
slave trade and work to remove the tarnish Stanton said afflicted the national character.
Where men like Bard, Mitchell, and Stanton were most concerned with laying out the
proposed tax’s role in expressing the general government’s disapproval of the slave trade,
Representative William Findley chose instead to directly address one of the major points of
criticism of the tax. Some representatives had expressed concern that the general government
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would use money gained from the slave trade to build the nation. In reply to concerns of this
nature, Findley suggested that no one need see using the funds a tax on the slave trade would
generate as shameful. He suggested, “In laying the tax, we shall do all we can to discourage [the
slave trade]; and if we do not like to see the money derived from taxing it in the common way.
We may apply it to special objects”—to relieve the conditions of slavery, for example.87 Though
the source of the funds may be objectionable, the funds themselves need not be viewed in a
negative light. Findley saw the tax as an opportunity to express disapproval of importing slaves,
a subject on which all members of the House seemed united. To him, this was the only
constitutional remedy Congress had for the trade at present, and he thought it proper that they
should use it.88
For Representative John Smilie of Pennsylvania, the revenue the tax would raise was a
source of concern, as it was for some of the tax’s opponents. In his opinion, though, the chief
purpose of the tax was not revenue. If he had thought otherwise, he would have objected, he
said, “for he abhorred the idea of raising a revenue from a traffic in human beings.”89 More was
at stake than money; Smilie “viewed the subject on a larger scale. He considered its effect on
national character.”90 Like Bard and Findley, he was confident that the tax would show the
general government’s disapproval of the transatlantic slave trade. While the proposed tax on the
slave trade was, admittedly, small, even such a small tax would “show that it [the transatlantic
slave trade] was a trade not approbated by the Legislature of the Union.”91 The members of the
House of Representatives, Smilie said, had a responsibility to express their opinions on the
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reopening of the slave trade, and this tax provided them with the opportunity. With this in mind,
he asked “whether it would be for the reputation of the nation to reject” the tax.92 The answer
was a simple one for Smilie: the nation’s reputation—the national character—was best served by
passing the tax.
Despite the arguments of Bard and several others who supported the proposed tax, a
number of members of the House expressed concern that, far from the national character being
best served by passing the tax, the case was precisely the opposite. Lowndes had been the first to
suggest that the proposed tax would sanction the transatlantic slave trade. He stated, “Was I
friendly to the trade, I should, without any hesitation, embrace the proposition contained in the
resolution, and I should consider it a point gained of no small importance, that the Legislature of
the General Government had given a sanction to it—for I can regard the Government deriving
revenue from it in no other light than a sanction.”93 Friends of the slave trade would, by this
reasoning, rejoice if Congress passed the tax. While this point was secondary to Lowndes’s
assertion that South Carolina was a sovereign state with the right to engage in the slave trade as it
chose, other representatives quickly adopted the argument. Some, like Lowndes, used the
argument that the tax would sanction the slave trade to supplement their arguments about state
rights. A few, however, used this argument quite differently. They argued that the proposed tax
would show the general government’s approval of the slave trade to make the case that the tax
would have a negative impact on the national character. These men, who came from parts of the
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United States ranging from New England to the Lower South, opposed the tax, but on nationalist,
rather than on state rights grounds.
Representative George Bedinger of Kentucky stated that “if he could believe that the
imposition of a tax of ten dollars upon every imported negro would check the importation, he
would vote for it.”94 He believed, however, that a tax, particularly such a small one, would
sanction the trade, and the revenue the tax brought would be too little to be of any worth in light
of that apparent sanction. Representative Andrew Gregg of Pennsylvania, one of the senior
members of the House, agreed with Bedinger, claiming that placing a tax on imported slaves, no
matter the actual goal of the measure, would be seen as approving the trade. Initially, he said,
when Bard had first introduced his resolution, he had been in favor of the measure. After time
and reflection, however, Gregg admitted that he had “very considerable doubts.”95 He believed
the tax would not have the effect his colleagues claimed and might very well irritate South
Carolina into keeping the slave trade open out of spite.
If the Constitution had permitted, Gregg said, he would vote in favor of a tax of one
hundred or five hundred dollars per slave imported, as this would amount, more or less, to a
prohibition of the trade. As matters currently stood, however, he would prefer to see any other
good taxed, “rather than stain our Treasury by filling it with money collected from a duty on
imported slaves.”96 The initial purpose of the power to tax the slave trade was, Gregg believed,
to provide a check to the trade. At the time of the Constitutional Convention, Gregg reminded
his fellow representatives, the price of slaves had been much lower, and a tax might have had the
desired effect. The situation had changed over the past decade and a half, though, and Gregg
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asserted that the proposed tax could “neither prevent nor remedy the evil” of the slave trade.97
For Gregg, the tax would not end the slave trade and would give the trade government approval,
an outcome he certainly wanted to avoid. The tax, far from showing disapproval of the trade,
sanctioned it and tainted the national treasury, and for those reasons, Gregg would not support it.
Gregg was not the only one to express the sentiment that the treasury would be sullied by
funds received from taxing the slave trade. Representative Thomas Moore of South Carolina
also stated his belief that money from such a tax would not be to the nation’s credit or benefit.
He expressed his confidence that the House of Representatives would never “legalize an act by
which our national coffers will be stained with the price of liberty.”98 Moore believed the tax
would not discourage importation in the least and said he disapproved of any measure that drew
revenue from the slave trade. He did not suggest that Congress merely vote down Bard’s
resolution. If the members of the House wished to indicate the general government’s
disapprobation of his state’s actions, he proposed a substitute resolution “That this House receive
with painful sensibility information that one of the Southern States, by a repeal of certain
prohibitory laws, have permitted a traffic unjust in its nature, and highly impolitic in free
Governments.”99 The motion was out of order and so went nowhere, but it indicates that Moore
was not opposed to the general government expressing disapproval of South Carolina’s actions
or of the slave trade. He simply did not believe that the proposed tax could accomplish the
objective.100
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Representative Roger Griswold of Connecticut also expressed reservations about the
message a tax on the slave trade would convey. He claimed, “It will appear to the world that
Congress are raising a revenue from a commerce in slaves.”101 It mattered to Griswold and, he
assumed, his colleagues, what the world thought. To raise revenue from such a source would
discredit the United States in the eyes of other nations. He did not like or approve of the slave
trade, and he was confident that every representative in the House felt the same way. For this
reason, Griswold would not “consent to give it a legislative sanction.”102 He was in no doubt
that taxing the transatlantic slave trade would “be viewed in that light be the people of this
country and by the civilized world.” Like Bard, he did not question that the eyes of the world, or
at least of the nations of Europe, were upon the United States and would pass judgment on the
nation based on the general government’s reaction to South Carolina’s repeal of its ban on the
slave trade. He simply disagreed as to the appropriate action to take.
Unique among the members of the House, Griswold was the only representative to
express any doubts as to the constitutionality of the proposed tax. Everyone else apparently
agreed without question that it would be constitutional to impose the proposed ten-dollar tax on
the slave trade, as the Constitution explicitly gave Congress the power to pass such a tax.
Griswold contended that there were only two justifiable reasons for passing a tax: to discourage a
particular trade and to collect revenue. The Constitution forbade Congress to do anything to
discourage the slave trade prior to 1808, he claimed. In any case, he did not believe the proposed
tax would discourage the trade. As for revenue, he pointed out that Congress had not received a
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report “that the Treasury is deficient in receipts.” They had no pressing need for the money,
Griswold said. More importantly, though, revenue gained from such a source would be tainted.
Furthermore, to pass the tax would recognize “a traffic in human flesh” as legitimate; it would
sanction the transatlantic slave trade in the eyes of the nation and the world.103
Gregg, Moore, and Griswold all opposed taxing the transatlantic slave trade because they
believed such a tax would show government approval or sanction for the trade. Unlike most of
the representatives from the Lower South who argued against the tax, they did not oppose it on
the grounds of state sovereignty; that South Carolina had the right, as a sovereign state, to decide
for itself whether or not to repeal its ban on the slave trade did not enter into their speeches at all,
though even several of those who supported the tax acknowledged this right.104 They instead
focused almost entirely on the meaning of the proposed tax for the nation. This focus helped to
shift attention away from state rights and avoided aligning opposition to the tax with a strictly
state rights agenda. It also reflected their desire to express the general government’s disapproval
of South Carolina’s repeal without supporting the tax.
By focusing on the meaning of the tax, these representatives met the tax’s supporters on
their own grounds. They made the issue a national one by discussing the tax’s impact on the
national character. Those who supported the tax said the eyes of the world were upon them.
These men agreed; the nations of the Atlantic world were watching the United States. What the
general government decided to do about South Carolina’s repeal of the ban on the slave trade
would impact the nation’s international reputation. For Gregg, Moore, Griswold, and the
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members of Congress who agreed with them, opposing the proposed tax was the best way to
uphold that reputation. By so arguing, they were able to simultaneously side with the state rights
representatives from the Lower South in opposing the tax without conceding the general
government’s interest and right to legislate on this and related issues.
Though the tax on the transatlantic slave trade was defeated in the end, the debate
surrounding it raises several interesting questions about the members of Congress’s concern for
the national character and the role slavery played in the national government and in the
development of the national character. All of the representatives of the time seem to have agreed
that the transatlantic slave trade was wrong and had a negative effect on the national character.
Many firmly believed that the slave trade reflected poorly on the United States and that other
nations looked down on the U.S. as a result. Perhaps this was one reason why so many
considered the national ban on the transatlantic slave trade in 1808 a foregone conclusion,
though that had been far from the case when the participants at the Constitutional Convention
had limited Congress’s power to interfere with the trade until that year. Even several of those
who opposed the tax in 1804 expressed their hope and belief that the nation could end the slave
trade in the not-too-distant future and promised their votes for that measure when the time came.
This debate also demonstrates the variety of ways in which members of the House could
invoke concern for the national character to establish space and opportunity to discuss potentially
antislavery matters in Congress. Representatives in 1790 and had already demonstrated the
utility of invoking the national character to make slavery and antislavery national issues rather
than state ones; in 1790, focus on national character and national interest had provided the most
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effective, if still ultimately unsuccessful counter for state rights arguments. In 1804, the ways in
which members of the House used national character when discussing slavery and the slave trade
expanded. Here, they were not opposing a vocally proslavery block, but debating how best to
show disapproval of South Carolina’s involvement with the transatlantic slave trade. While one
group still based its argument on state sovereignty, both representatives who supported the tax
and some who opposed it invoked concern for the national character to support their arguments
while leaving the way open for further discussion of opposition to slavery and the slave trade and
supporting the idea that the general government had the authority to censure a state’s actions
when it came to slavery.
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CHAPTER THREE
“WHAT WILL THE NATIONS OF THE EARTH THINK OF US?”: THE MISSOURI CRISIS
AND THE NATIONAL CHARACTER

In the years directly following the close of the transatlantic slave trade in 1808, slavery
was, for a time, a less pressing issue in national politics. Despite the diminished attention
slavery received in Congress, it never entirely disappeared, and it often appeared in debates that,
on the surface, had little to do with slavery. One of the areas in which it received increasing
attention, however, had to do with the expansion of the institution.105 Settlers with a variety of
motives flocked to the territories, increasing the population in those territories, which,
eventually, led in turn to territories applying for statehood. Between 1808 and 1820, five new
states were admitted to the Union—three states that embraced slavery and two that forbade it—
bringing the total to eleven states where slavery was diminishing or entirely forbidden and eleven
states that supported slavery. In 1819, Congress began discussing a bill admitting the state of
Missouri to the Union. Almost immediately upon the commencement of the discussion of the
bill, Representative James Tallmadge of New York proposed an amendment that would restrict
slavery in Missouri. The amendment stipulated “That the further introduction of slavery or
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involuntary servitude be prohibited, except for the punishment of crimes, whereof the party shall
have been fully convicted; and that all children born within the said State, after the admission
thereof into the Union, shall be free at the age of twenty-five years.”106 In other words, Missouri
would be required to prohibit the introduction of new slaves to the state and to gradually
emancipate the slaves currently in the state as a condition of statehood.
Tallmadge’s motives for proposing the amendment were and remain unclear. When
Tallmadge presented his amendment for the House’s consideration in February of 1819, he had
been a member of Congress for just over two years, and he was already planning to retire from
Congress at the end of the session. During his time in Congress he had done little to distinguish
himself politically. He did have an established political antislavery record, though. In 1817, he
helped shape New York’s final emancipation law. A year later, in 1818, Tallmadge urged the
U.S. House of Representatives to reject Illinois’s application for statehood on the grounds that
Illinois’s proposed constitution violated the Northwest Ordinance of 1787. The constitution
would “permit the hiring of slaves...for any number of years consecutively” and call it indentured
servitude.107 Tallmadge stated that even if slavery was not adopted in the Illinois constitution in
so many words, the document did not sufficiently prohibit slavery, either. While his precise
motives in suggesting the restriction of slavery in Missouri are unclear, the motion was certainly
not out of character for Tallmadge.108
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No matter what Tallmadge’s motives might have been, the proposed amendment set off
an explosive debate in the House about the ability of Congress to restrict slavery.109 Quite apart
from the divisive nature of slavery in politics, those involved in the debate recognized that more
was at stake than just slavery in Missouri. John Craig Hammond states, “Northerners
immediately sensed that Tallmadge’s plan involved much more than the future of Missouri
slavery....Missouri would set a precedent for the remainder of the vast Louisiana Purchase.”110
They knew that the decision Congress made about slavery in Missouri would shape the course of
slavery in all United States territory west of the Mississippi River. Southerners seem to have
been similarly cognizant of the implications of the Tallmadge Amendment. The amendment’s
supporters, who came almost universally from free northern states, asserted that Congress had
the right to govern the territories, and Missouri was a territory until admitted as a state. Those
who opposed the amendment came primarily from slaveholding states and emphatically argued
that Congress did not have power to restrict slavery in any sovereign state, which Missouri
would soon be.
Two major questions governed the course of the debates about restricting slavery in
Missouri. First, was it constitutional? Second, was it expedient? Every member of Congress
who spoke over the course of the debates centered his response around addressing these
questions of constitutionality and expediency. Those who supported the Tallmadge Amendment
argued that it was both constitutional and expedient, while those who argued against the
amendment, unsurprisingly, argued the opposite.
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When discussing the question of constitutionality, the members of the House focused
primarily on the issues of Congress’s power in the territories and the powers reserved to the
states. Representatives who favored the proposed amendment contended that the Constitution
gave Congress power to govern the territories and to admit new states to the Union, so by
extension it gave the general government the power to set conditions for admission. Essentially,
they argued, Congress had the power to exert authority over an incoming state to restrict slavery.
Their opponents insisted that, as the Constitution did not explicitly give Congress power over
slavery, that power was reserved to the individual states. This argument was, of course, nothing
new; men such as Representatives Burke and Baldwin had made the same claim in 1790 when
opposing the reception and discussion of antislavery petitions. Slavery, from a strict
constructionist view of the Constitution, was a matter of state rights; the Tenth Amendment
reserved the powers not delegated to the general government to the states. That power to
legislate concerning slavery was not delegated to the general government by the Constitution
was the grounds on which most representatives from slaveholding states based their
constitutional opposition to the Tallmadge Amendment. Neither those who supported nor those
who opposed the Tallmadge Amendment were willing to concede the matter of constitutionality,
and their interpretations of the Constitution remained polar opposites throughout the debates.
In addition to this irreconcilable question of whether or not a restriction on slavery was
constitutional was the question of whether or not such a restriction was expedient. Even if the
Constitution gave Congress the power to restrict slavery in Missouri, was it a good, practical,
idea? When addressing this question, the representatives drew on a number of relevant
precedents and ideas to make their cases for their respective positions. Two documents received
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frequent mention over the course of the debates: the Northwest Ordinance of 1787 and the
Louisiana Purchase Treaty. The Northwest Ordinance had stipulated that the territories that
became Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois would not permit or support slavery within their boundaries.
Congress had passed the ordinance under the Articles of Confederation, and it had been ratified
or reinstituted under the Constitution with little opposition. While Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois
had all dealt with some internal opposition to the restriction on slavery, all had overcome this
opposition and had entered the Union with restrictions on slavery.111
Proponents of the proposed restriction of slavery in Missouri argued that no one had
taken exception to the restrictions set in place by the Northwest Ordinance or argued against the
ordinance’s constitutionality. In their eyes, Missouri ought to be no different. Just as the general
government had possessed the power to restrict slavery in the northwest territories—which had
become primarily nonslaveholding states—it should have the same power to restrict slavery in
Missouri. Representative Clifton Clagett of New Hampshire called the Northwest Ordinance
“that invaluable ordinance of 1787 “ and pointed out that many of the men who passed the
ordinance “were among those who formed your Constitution.” The Northwest Ordinance and
the Constitution were, Clagett said, based upon the same principles of civil and religious
liberty.112 Clagett and many others who favored restriction assured the South that they did not
intend to interfere with slavery where it already existed. Even the staunchest supporters of the
Tallmadge Amendment acknowledged that Congress had no right to interfere with slavery in the
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slaveholding states. However, the Northwest Ordinance was proof that Congress could stop
slavery’s spread in the territories.
The Tallmadge Amendment’s opponents countered these arguments with the assertion
that the Northwest Ordinance had been a unique case, carried over from a previous government.
Missouri, along with all of the territory gained in the Louisiana Purchase, came with its own
unique set of stipulations regarding statehood. In the Louisiana Purchase Treaty, the United
States agreed to admit the purchased territories on an equal footing with all of the existing
sovereign states. This, the representatives of the slaveholding states claimed, meant permitting
Missouri to decide for itself whether or not it would permit slavery, just like the states already
belonging to the Union. For Congress to abridge this power would violate the treaty with
France, as it would make Missouri—and presumably other states that would follow—inferior to
the existing states. The representative from Missouri, John Scott, contended that “if the citizens
of Pennsylvania or Virginia enjoyed the right, in their own State, to decide the question whether
they would have slavery or not, the citizens of Missouri, to give them the same privileges, must
have the same right to decide whether they would or would not tolerate slavery in their State.” If
Missouri did not have this right, “then the citizens of Pennsylvania and Virginia would have
more rights, privileges, and powers...than the citizens of Missouri.” This situation, Scott—and
others—claimed, would be unjust to the people of Missouri.113
The members of the House of Representatives went back and forth on these and related
issues pertaining to the expediency of Tallmadge’s proposed restriction. One representative
pointed out that a restriction would mean nothing, as Missouri, as soon as it became a state,
could turn around and form a new constitution that permitted slavery, making the restriction
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pointless.114 Others indicated that slavery already existed in Missouri, so even if Congress
passed the restriction and Missouri accepted it and became a state, enforcement would always be
a problem. Representative Robert Reid of Georgia even presented the possibility that, if
Congress denied the people of Missouri the right to decide for themselves whether or not to
permit slavery within their state, they would resist “in proportion to your [Congress’s]
oppression.”115 There was every possibility that Missouri might rebel if Congress voted to
restrict slavery there.
In the midst of these great questions of the constitutionality and expediency of the
Tallmadge Amendment, a small group of representatives strove to push back against the state
rights arguments advanced by representatives from the slaveholding states by expressing concern
for the effect of slavery on the national character, just as had happened in 1790 and 1804. They
reminded the members of the House that the world was watching their nation to see whether it
would stay true to its republican principles and commitment to liberty. While invocations of the
national character never formed the entirety of a representative’s argument, representatives’
efforts to draw their colleagues’ attention to the implications of the Tallmadge Amendment for
the national character provide insight to some of tactics of antislavery advocates in Congress. As
members of Congress had done in 1790 and 1804, when confronted with state rights arguments
against antislavery measures of any kind, those who raised their concerns for the national
character during the debates over restricting slavery in Missouri did so to push back against the
argument that slavery was purely a state issue and to assert slavery’s (and antislavery’s) place as

113

1202.

114

Annals, 15th Congress, 2nd Session, 1197.
Representative Scott of Missouri alludes to this possibility in Annals, 15th Congress, 2nd Session, 1201-

115

Annals, 16th Congress, 1st Session, 1033.

64

a national issue in Congress. These representatives went further in their efforts to assert general
government authority over slavery than those in 1804 had done, though. In 1804, members of
the House had invoked concern for the national character to justify the general government
censuring South Carolina for reopening the transatlantic slave trade. Members of the House in
1819 and 1820, on the other hand, used concern for the national character to justify the general
government asserting authority directly over slavery in a soon-to-be sovereign state. Because
slavery was so detrimental to the national character, the argument went, the general government
had a right and a responsibility to check its growth where possible.
Tallmadge himself cited a concern for the national character among his reasons for
proposing the restrictions on slavery in Missouri. A few days after he proposed the amendment,
he gave a long speech in defense of his proposal. He said he had not meant to provoke such
debate. Certainly, he did not mean to argue either for or against slavery as a moral right, though,
he pointed out, “How gladly would the ‘legitimates of Europe chuckle’ to find an American
Congress in debate on such a question!”116 At a time when Europeans were increasingly coming
to view slavery as morally wrong, it seemed absurd to debate that point in the general
government of a nation that prided itself on its liberty. The representative from New York
recognized that the subject of slavery was a delicate one. It tended to raise alarm and even
concern for their safety among the southern slaveholding states.117 He saw in the admission of
Missouri, however, an opportunity to set boundaries against slavery’s further expansion.
The nation, Tallmadge said, stood at a crossroads between liberty and slavery. The
United States was an “extended empire, inhabited by the hardy sons of American freemen,” and
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by comparison, “the Governments of Europe dwindle into insignificance, and the whole world is
without a parallel.” Tallmadge told the members of the House that the nation was currently a
great empire. He also offered a warning, however: “reverse this scene; people this fair dominion
with the slaves of our planters; extend slavery—this bane of man, this abomination of heaven—
over your extended empire, and you prepare its dissolution.”118 If Congress took this opportunity
to restrict slavery, the nation was well on its way to becoming a greater empire than all the
nations of Europe. If, however, the general government failed to act while it had the chance, the
nation would fall. “With this defect,” Tallmadge predicted, “your Government must crumble to
pieces, and your people become the scoff of the world.”119 Instead of becoming a great empire
that would make the European governments look insignificant, the United States would be an
object of ridicule and scorn among its peers.
Furthermore, Tallmadge was certain that the United States would become “the scoff of
the world” if it permitted the expansion of slavery. He reminded Congress that “on this subject
the eyes of Europe are turned upon you....If you allow slavery to pass into Territories where you
have the lawful power to exclude it, you will justly take upon yourself all the charges of
inconsistency.”120 After all, the nation had already been the subject of British censure because of
the institution of slavery, an institution that seemed inconsistent with human decency and with
the principles of liberty.121 The United States claimed, by virtue of the Constitution and the
Declaration of Independence, to be a free country. In 1776, the United States had declared to the
world that all men were created equal, yet it permitted the enslavement of a significant number
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of people. The existence of slavery in a purportedly free nation exposed the nation to outside
censure. If Congress would act against the spread of slavery, however, confining the institution
to where it existed when the government was established, to states east of the Mississippi River,
the general government could be acquitted of the stains slavery attached to the national
character.122
Representative Arthur Livermore of New Hampshire, in an earlier speech, had made
similar claims regarding the opportunity to check the spread of slavery then before the general
government. He stated, “An opportunity is now presented, if not to diminish, at least to prevent,
the growth of a sin which sits heavy on the soul of every one of us.” According to Livermore,
Missouri’s impending admission to the Union gave Congress an opportunity to take action
against slavery in a constitutional manner. He, like his colleagues, acknowledged that slavery
must be left alone in the states that supported it, but the Tallmadge Amendment represented
Congress’s best chance to stop slavery from spreading. By so doing, Livermore said, “we may
retrieve the national character, and, in some degree, our own.” This was a chance for
redemption, both personal and collective. The national character, if the nation carried on
permitting slavery to spread, was in danger; both the national character and the individual
characters of the members of Congress were tarnished by the existence and increase of slavery in
the United States. To act against it was to improve that character. If Congress could not bring
itself to act against the spread of slavery in the territories, though, Livermore called upon his
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colleagues in the House to be consistent “and declare that our Constitution was made to impose
slavery, and not to establish liberty.”123
Scott, the sole representative from Missouri in the House, countered such claims with the
assertion that the amendment, which its supporters said would uphold the nation’s commitment
to liberty, would destroy the liberties of the people in Missouri.124 The people of Missouri would
not be allowed to decide for themselves, as others had, whether or not to permit slavery among
them. Despite this and numerous other arguments against the Tallmadge Amendment, though,
the House narrowly voted in favor of the amendment, and, a few days later, passed the bill on
Missouri statehood.125
If the controversy ended there, it would appear to be a triumph for the opponents of
slavery. In late February, however, the Senate returned the bill to the House having approved
everything except the restrictions on slavery. After a relatively brief debate that reiterated many
of the same arguments as before, the House again passed the amendment, and the Senate again
rejected it, putting the Senate and the House at an impasse.126 Shortly thereafter, Congress
adjourned, effectively killing the bill for Missouri statehood.127
The House resumed discussion of Missouri statehood in December 1819, and though
Tallmadge was not longer present, the same issues that had plagued the previous Congress
dominated the debates. The proposal to restrict slavery in Missouri again raised questions of
constitutionality and expediency that largely dictated the terms of the debates, with each side
determined to show that its position was the constitutional position and would best serve the
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nation. Unlike during the debates of several months previous, some representatives began to hint
that the debates had gone on too long, and others began to suggest that a compromise would be
necessary.128 The majority, however, stayed focused on arguing that the proposed restrictions
were constitutional and expedient or that they were unconstitutional and inexpedient.
Some of the restriction’s supporters again chose to invoke concern for the national
character to support their arguments. Representative John Taylor of New York gave a long
speech in favor of the restrictions in which he expressed concern for others’ perceptions of the
general government if Congress failed to act against the expansion of slavery west of the
Mississippi. Like other supporters of the proposed amendment, he argued in favor of the
constitutionality of the measure, basing his argument upon the powers of Congress to make rules
regarding the territories and to admit new states to the Union. More significant for his argument,
though, was a discussion of Congress’s responsibility concerning slavery. Taylor asserted,
“Possessing, as we do, both a moral and Constitutional right to require of Missouri a provision
against slavery, as a condition of her admission, if we fail to exert it, we shall justly incur the
reproach of our contemporaries, and the malediction of posterity.”129 If Congress failed to act
against slavery where it had the constitutional right to do so, Taylor said, those with their eyes on
the United States, waiting for the nation to uphold its avowed dedication to liberty, would be
right to reproach the nation. Additionally, their own posterity would have that same right. The
nation’s character mattered not just for the present, but for the future, as well. The character the
general government established by its actions was the one future generations would inherit,
whether for good or ill.
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Representative Clifton Clagett of New Hampshire presented his concern for the national
character in stronger language than Taylor had. After establishing his view of slavery as a great
evil, he asked pointedly, “What will the nations of the earth think of us?”130 If the general
government of the United States permitted slavery to extend across the entirety of the nation, a
territory he was certain would span the entire distance between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans,
this would reflect poorly on the nation in the eyes of its fellow nations. Clagett suggested that
Congress should “close the door against this great evil, and evince to an attentive world that we
are just, as well as free.”131 The world was paying attention to the debates taking place in the
U.S. House of Representatives and would judge the nation based on the House’s actions. It was
the responsibility of the United States, in the spotlight as the nation was, to uphold the principles
upon which it had been founded. Clagett identified these principles for any of his colleagues
who might be in doubt as to what they were: “civil and religious liberty, [and] the rights of
man.”132 The perpetuation and, more particularly, the extension of slavery constituted a clear
departure from these principles, particularly a departure from civil liberty and the rights of man,
for Clagett. If the nation chose to permit slavery to spread to the territory west of the
Mississippi, it would signal to the world that the United States was no longer built upon
principles of liberty.
Representative Daniel Cook of Illinois also spoke in favor of restricting slavery in
Missouri. Only a few years previous, a proslavery faction in Illinois had agitated for the repeal
of Article VI of the Northwest Ordinance, the part of the law prohibiting slavery in the territories
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of the northwest. They had made efforts to have their state admitted to the Union with no
restrictions on slavery, and while these efforts had ultimately not prevailed, Illinois had a bit of a
complicated relationship with slavery.133 Cook no doubt considered such complications and the
legacy of his own state as he spoke in favor of restricting slavery in Missouri. There was nothing
complicated about Cook’s position, though; he did not hesitate to call slavery an evil and a
misfortune. While he claimed that he believed the proposed restriction against slavery in
Missouri was constitutional, he also asserted that he would support restriction no matter what
because that was what best for the country. Slavery had a pernicious influence on society; “The
love of ease and pleasure are the scions which shoot from the root of slavery,” Cook asserted.
“The more they are extended, therefore, the more will this canker spread, so fatal to liberty, and
the more difficult will it be to effect their manumission.”134 Spreading slavery would spread an
infection throughout the nation, one that would, in the end, destroy the liberty of the nation and
the nation’s people.135
Cook asserted that the United States had set itself up as an example to the world. He
declared, “we have attempted to plant in the American soil the principles of free and republican
government; we have attempted to set an example to the world of the capacity of man to govern
himself, and of securing to all the enjoyment of equal rights.”136 This was the nation’s goal and
its role in the world: it was to be an example of self-government and equality. However, Cook
pointed out, “the brilliancy of this example abroad is too much darkened by the gloom which
slavery spreads over it, and while we continue to spread that gloom, the happy influence of
133
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republican government will continue to be weakened, till ultimately, like the sun, whose rays are
obstructed by an impenetrable cloud, its influence will be entirely lost.”137 For Cook, slavery
overshadowed the example the nation was intended to set. The existence of slavery anywhere in
the nation contributed to the cloud obscuring the brilliance of that example. To let it spread,
Cook claimed, would be to let darkness overtake light, to ultimately experience the failure of the
United States’ republican experiment, and to lose the nation’s standing in the world. To prevent
the fate Cook considered so lamentable, it was up to the general government to prove that
slavery only existed in the nation because it had been forced upon it before its founding. And
what if the government allowed slavery to spread, Cook asked. Surely it would indicate that
slavery existed in the United States not by necessity only, but also by choice. If the general
government was to show itself consistent with the nation’s founding principles, it must restrict
slavery’s extension; it was, Cook claimed, what was owed “to the character of our
Government.”138
Representative Joseph Hemphill of Pennsylvania agreed with Cook about the effects of
slavery on the nation. He asked Congress, “What can more directly attack the welfare of society
than to hold a race of people in bondage?” Hemphill compared the enslavement of people of
African descent to the enslavement of Native Americans in New York, or any other state, for that
matter. If a state chose to enslave the native peoples within its borders, the rest of the nation
would likely be outraged. It would be an offense against “divine and human justice.”139
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Slavery—racial slavery—had a negative effect on society, and the right to hold slaves, Hemphill
concluded, was not a right at all. and to assert otherwise flew in the face of justice.
Quite apart from the moral and social arguments, however, there were political issues to
consider, and Hemphill was convinced that if Congress did not restrict slavery in Missouri, it
would never have the power and authority to do so elsewhere, either. This issue of restricting
slavery in Missouri was, in Hemphill’s eyes, “one of the highest character, as it regards the honor
and future prosperity of this country.” Halting the spread of slavery was, to him, a matter of the
nation’s prosperity and honor—its character. Threats that the Union would dissolve, which had
made an appearance more than once over the course of the debates, were not likely to be carried
out, nor were they justified. Hemphill asserted, “I have a more exalted opinion of the patriotism
of the South; they will never cause American blood to be spilt, unless for reasons that would
justify them in the eyes of the world.” To shed American blood in defense of the institution of
slavery was, to Hemphill, completely unjustified in the world’s eyes; the world sided with those
who wished to check the spread of slavery.140
Hemphill’s fellow Pennsylvanian John Sergeant was even more explicit in his concern
for the national character. He directly attacked the argument that slavery was a matter of state
rights, stating that a state was “the creature of the Constitution; deriving from the Constitution its
existence and all its rights, and possessing no power but what is imparted to it by the
Constitution.” This being the case, “If it have a power to establish slavery, it derives that power
from the Constitution, and the Constitution becomes stained with the sin of having originated a
state of slavery.”141 If states could establish slavery, then the Constitution itself established,
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upheld, and perpetuated slavery. Many southern representatives would have had no problem
with this interpretation of the Constitution; several had claimed during these debates and earlier
that the Constitution protected slavery. Representatives from the Lower South had made that
argument during the debates about the antislavery petitions in 1790.142 This would be a sad
reflection upon the Constitution, though, Sergeant said. Such an argument was, in his view,
“calculated to diminish the sacred regard that has been felt for it here and abroad.”143 Even those
who resided outside the United States, who did not fall under the rule of the Constitution, held
the document in high regard. Claiming that a state could decide to establish slavery by virtue of
the Constitution damaged that regard.
More than the nature or integrity of the Constitution was at stake in this matter, according
to Sergeant. There was no question in his mind that the European nations would reproach the
United States for the inconsistencies between the nation’s stated principles and its actions
regarding slavery. This certainty stemmed from recent experience, as Britain had rebuked the
United States on this very issue. Sergeant’s fellow antislavery Pennsylvanian, Robert Walsh, in
his Appeal, acknowledged that slavery was the weakest point in the nation’s character.144 With
this vulnerability in mind, Sergeant stated,
When Europeans reproach us with our negro slavery; when they contrast our republican
boast and pretensions with the existence of this condition among us, we have our answer
ready—it is to you we owe this evil; you planted it here, and it has taken such root in the
soil that we have not the power to eradicate it. Then, turning to the West, and directing
their attention to Ohio, Indiana, and Illinois, we can proudly tell them these are the
offspring of our policy and our laws, these are the free productions of the Constitution of
the United States.145
142

The extent to which the Constitution supported or protected slavery is still a topic of debate. See
Waldstreicher, Slavery’s Constitution; Van Cleve, A Slaveholders’ Union; Wilentz, No Property in Man for recent
contributions to this debate.
143
Annals, 16th Congress, 1st Session, 1188.
144
Mason, “The Battle of the Slaveholding Liberators,” 683-684.
145
Annals, 16th Congress, 1st Session, 1217.

74

Slavery in the states where it currently existed, Sergeant claimed, could be blamed entirely upon
the Europeans who had colonized the land. The Americans had inherited the institution from
Europe and were not in a position to do away with it where it already existed. This removed any
reproach from the slaveholding states—it was Europe’s fault, not theirs, that they were
dependent upon slave labor. If Congress permitted slavery to expand beyond that area where
slavery was already established, however, it would be a different situation. If the general
government allowed slavery to expand west of the Mississippi, the United States, not the nations
of Europe, would be responsible for that “dark spot upon the face of the new creation.”146 The
United States could no longer claim to be beyond reproach in this matter. To prevent this,
Sergeant proposed, “Let us give to the world a new pledge of our sincerity. Let the standard of
freedom be planted in Missouri, by the hands of the Constitution, and let its banner wave over
the heads of none but freemen.” Renewing the nation’s dedication to freedom in such a visible
way would keep it above the reproach of Europe. “Then,” said Sergeant, “as our republican
States extend, republican principles will go hand in hand with republican practice—the love of
liberty with the sense of justice.”147
These discussions of national character played an important role in asserting the national
importance of slavery. Just as in 1790 and 1804, the representatives who used national character
did so in opposition to the claims of many representatives from slaveholding states that slavery
was rightfully a state issue. The opponents of the Tallmadge Amendment made a case for
making slavery about state rights in order to defeat the proposed restrictions on slavery in
Missouri, attempting to close off the possibility of further discussion of antislavery measures in
146
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Congress. Representatives who supported the Tallmadge Amendment combated this attempt in
part by tying antislavery to concern for the national character. In 1790, such tactics had helped
to create a space for the discussion of antislavery goals in Congress. When debating taxing the
transatlantic slave trade in 1804, several representatives had taken this to a new level by using
concern for the national character to support the general government censuring a state for
involvement in the trade. Now, in the debates over slavery in Missouri, representatives had
taken yet another step in their use of the national character. Like the representatives in 1790 and
1804, these men used concern for the national character to support their position that slavery was
a national issue, not solely a state one. These members of the House used this, though, to make a
case for general government interference in slavery in an incoming state. This went beyond even
censure. It was the culmination of two decades of striving to make slavery a national issue based
on concern for the nation’s character.
In the end, neither those who favored restricting slavery nor those who opposed it got
everything they wanted; the heated debates about the restriction of slavery in Missouri ended in
compromise. While Congress had been debating the terms of Missouri statehood at length,
Maine had also applied for statehood. The Senate linked the admission of Maine and Missouri,
then amended the statehood bill to admit Maine as a state without slaves and Missouri with no
legal restrictions on slavery. This kept a balance between the number of restrictionist states and
the number of anti-restrictionist states in the nation. The Senate bill also prohibited slavery in the
Louisiana Territory north of Missouri’s southern border. The bill passed in the Senate, but it was
defeated in the House.
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Despite the bill’s defeat, however, its measures largely constituted what became the
Missouri Compromise. At the end of February 1820, the House agreed to a joint conference with
the Senate concerning the crisis. This resulted in a bill that looked much like the Senate’s earlier
one. Knowing the House would never pass the compromise in its entirety, Henry Clay, the
Speaker of the House, contrived to have the bill broken into pieces to be voted on separately. In
the end, the individual parts of the compromise did pass, settling for a generation the issue of
slavery in the territories.148
With the passage of the Missouri Compromise, the debate about slavery in the territories
faded from discussion. The place of slavery and antislavery in Congress remained unresolved,
though. Since the issue first arose in the House of Representatives in 1790, many
representatives, primarily from the Lower South, though increasingly from other slaveholding
states, had argued that the Constitution gave Congress no authority over slavery and only limited
authority over the slave trade. For this reason, the representatives claimed, slavery and the slave
trade were state issues, not national ones. During this same period, several representatives strove
to counter this argument by establishing the impact of slavery on the nation as a whole. One way
they did this was to argue that slavery and the slave trade negatively impacted the national
character, or the nation’s reputation in the Atlantic world, using this argument to justify
attempting to exert increasing amounts of general government authority over slavery.
This pattern held true in the debates over restricting slavery in Missouri. As in 1790 and
1804, slaveholders and their allies reminded their colleagues in the House of Representatives that
powers not expressly delegated to the general government in the Constitution were reserved to
the individual states, invoking state rights in defense of slavery. They strove to establish that
148
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Congress had no constitutional power to act against slavery in the ways proposed. And as part of
their efforts to defend the Tallmadge Amendment and restriction of slavery in Missouri,
members of the House of Representatives used claims about slavery’s impact on the national
character to resist the state rights arguments and justify national interest in and general
government authority over certain aspects of slavery. Though Congress ultimately decided to
permit Missouri to enter the Union with no restrictions on slavery, representatives’ expressions
of concern for the national character helped to shape the debates on the issue and on the future of
the general government’s relations with slavery and antislavery.
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CONCLUSION

Between the ratification of the Constitution and the Missouri Crisis, slavery played a
significant role in the politics of the new nation, a role that has gained greater attention in the
past few decades. From 1790, when it had not yet been entirely established that slavery had any
role in the business of the general government, to 1804, when the representatives from
slaveholding and non-slaveholding states alike eagerly looked forward to the day that Congress
could act against the transatlantic slave trade, to 1819 and 1820, when the issue of slavery in one
state nearly tore the nation in two, the issues of slavery and the slave trade generated a great deal
of discussion in the House of Representatives. In these discussions, the idea of national
character played an important part, legitimizing the discussion of slavery and the entertainment
of antislavery measures in Congress.
In 1790, a few representatives used the ideas of national character and national interest to
establish a space for discussion of slavery and the slave trade in Congress. In 1804, members of
the House invoked the concept of national character to argue both for and against imposing a tax
on slave importations following South Carolina’s decision to reopen the transatlantic slave trade,
with the goal of showing the general government’s disapproval of this state action. In 1819 and
1820, as the nation exploded over the question of Missouri’s admission to the Union,
congressional supporters of slavery’s restriction used the idea of the national character as part of
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a larger argument against an anti-restrictionist attempt to make slavery purely a state issue and to
legitimize opposition to the expansion of slavery in the United States. These congressmen strove
to impose general government authority over slavery in an incoming state to stop the spread of
slavery in the nation.
During these three debates, slaveholding representatives, primarily from the Lower
South, attempted to call into question the general government’s right to discuss slavery and,
more particularly, antislavery. They based their positions on a number of constitutional
arguments, as well as day-to-day considerations of the effects proposed measures would have.
Many of these men saw slavery and access to the transatlantic slave trade as protected rights in
which the general government could not interfere, and they strove to put as many safeguards for
these rights in place as possible. While their opponents employed a variety of tactics in
opposition to these efforts, connecting slavery and the slave trade to the national character
proved one particularly effective means of keeping the issues in the national dialogue,
legitimizing them as national issues and making a case for exercising general government
authority over them.
Discussion of national character in congressional debates about slavery in the early
republic also highlights how Americans thought about their nation. Their expressions of concern
about what other nations would think about them demonstrate a preoccupation with the United
States’ place among the nations of the Atlantic world. That preoccupation shaped the nation’s
approach to slavery and the relationship between slavery and the general government.
Understanding the ways in which the members of the U.S. House of Representatives used the
sense that other nations were watching the nation as a political tool also provides greater insight
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to disagreements concerning the balance between state and national power following the
ratification of the Constitution. Finally, examining congressional debates about slavery through
the lens of national character provides additional perspective on the complicated relationship
between slavery and the founding principles of the United States embodied in the Declaration of
Independence and the Constitution and shows how contested this topic was in national politics in
the decades following the Revolution.
In 1819, Robert Walsh wrote that the British had said the United States as a nation was
“below the least and lowest of the European nations in the scale of wisdom and virtue” because
of its involvement with slavery.149 American slavery gave Europeans cause to cast aspersion on
the national character of the United States. It was concern for the national character, though,
fueled in part by such accusations, that gave legitimacy to the antislavery cause in Congress in
the early American republic.
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